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EXCAVATING FROM THE INSIDE: 
RACE, GENDER, AND PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES 
―Class, race, sexuality, gender—and all other categories 
by which we categorize and dismiss each other—need to be excavated from 
the inside.‖1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The attorney begins by asking Juror Number Four, a white male, 
questions about his background.  ―Do you have any legal training?‖ 
―No,‖ Juror Number Four replies. 
―Please tell me your present occupation.‖ 
―I do construction and landscaping.‖ 
―Do you have children?‖ 
―Yes.‖ 
―How many?‖ 
―Two.‖ 
The questions continue until the attorney moves on to another 
potential juror. 
The men and women in the jury box know why they are being 
questioned.  The attorneys for both sides are trying to determine whether 
these individuals would make ―good‖ jurors.  Can they be fair?  
Impartial?  With whom will they relate? 
Eventually, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor requests 
that Juror Number Two, a black male, be excused.  Next, the prosecutor 
requests that Juror Number Six, another black male, be excused.  Defense 
counsel objects.  ―Your Honor, the State is attempting to use its 
peremptory challenges to strike black men from the jury because of their 
race and sex.  I ask that you require the State to offer race and gender 
neutral reasons for its challenges.‖ 
The judge replies, ―There are quite a few black females on the venire.  
And there are quite a few white men.  It doesn‘t appear that the State is 
discriminating based on race or gender.‖2 
―Your Honor,‖ defense counsel explains, ―the State is attempting to 
excuse these jurors based on their race and gender identity.  The answers 
that these jurors provided in response to the State‘s questions were all 
very similar to the answers offered by white male jurors, but the State 
did not excuse the white male jurors.  And both of these jurors assured 
                                                 
1 DOROTHY ALLISON, SKIN:  TALKING ABOUT SEX, CLASS & LITERATURE 35 (1994). 
2 This hypothetical situation is loosely based on People v. Washington.  See 628 N.E.2d 
351, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
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the court that they would be fair and impartial decisionmakers.  Also, 
most of the State‘s witnesses are going to be black females, while the 
defendant is a black male.  Eight percent of the venire was comprised of 
black males, and now the State has prohibited all of these black men 
from serving on this jury.  This isn‘t mere coincidence.  I respectfully 
request that the court require the State to explain why these two 
individuals cannot serve on this jury.‖ 
―What‘s so magical about black men?‖ asks the judge.3  ―Peremptory 
challenges cannot be based on race, but the State isn‘t eliminating all 
blacks.  Black women are on the jury.  Peremptory challenges cannot be 
based on sex.  Here, there are men on the jury and their race is irrelevant.  
The State is free to excuse these individuals without raising an inference 
of discrimination.  Your motion is denied.‖  The final jury is seated:  six 
white men, one white woman, and five black women.  One white 
woman and one black woman serve as alternates. 
In America, the right to a trial by jury is a greatly respected and 
constitutionally protected aspect of the legal system.4  Although 
participation in the judicial system was at one time expressly limited by 
race and gender identity, the law is now clear that individuals cannot be 
prohibited from serving on a jury because of their race, ethnicity, or 
                                                 
3 This statement is based on the judge‘s statement in People v. Motton.  See 704 P.2d 176, 
178 (Cal. 1985).  In that case, the trial judge asked defense counsel, ―What‘s so magic [sic] 
about Black women?‖ when the defense tried to establish a prima facie case of race-gender 
discrimination against black women.  Id. 
4 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (―The petit jury has occupied a central 
position in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the 
arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.‖) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 156 (1968)); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (―[T]he trial by jury ever has 
been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law.‖).  This respect 
for jury trials is entrenched in the belief that a just result is obtained through the 
deliberation and subsequent decision by a jury of one‘s peers.  Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (―It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common 
affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from 
admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.‖).  But see RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, 
THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM xx (2003) (―Why should anyone think that twelve persons 
brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of general ability, should 
have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?‖) (quoting Erwin 
Griswold, then Dean of Harvard Law School).  The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in 
criminal cases by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI.  Additionally, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury in civil 
cases.  Id. at VII.  The right to a trial by jury in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment, 
however, is not incorporated to the States.  JONAKAIT, supra, at 2.  Although juries decide 
some civil cases, a large proportion of state civil trials are not decided by a jury.  Id. at 13–
14. 
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gender.5  Additionally, defendants have a right to be tried by a jury 
selected through a process free from race and gender discrimination.6  
Despite these nondiscriminatory principles, discriminatory practices in 
jury selection continue to permeate the courtrooms, news reports, and 
public debate.7  The role of race, gender, and race-gender identity during 
jury selection, although a seemingly settled issue, has not been resolved.  
Courts are still struggling to determine whether peremptory challenges 
may be based on the combination of a potential juror‘s race and gender 
identity, as illustrated in the introductory hypothetical.8 
Part II of this Note first provides an overview of the jury selection 
process and outlines the state of the law regarding peremptory 
challenges.9  Part II also summarizes the methods by which courts have 
                                                 
5 See JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 114–15 (explaining that, historically, blacks and women 
were not permitted to serve on juries).  Even after the United States Supreme Court held 
that equal protection proscribes racial limitations on jury service, many jurisdictions 
implemented policies that prohibited black people from serving on juries.  Id. at 115; see also 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that African American men 
cannot be prohibited from serving on juries).  Women were also excluded from jury service 
until the twentieth century.  J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 131 (1994).  In Strauder v. West 
Virginia, where the Supreme Court held that African American men could not be 
prohibited from serving on juries because of their race, the Court refused to extend such 
protection to women.  See 100 U.S. at 310 (limiting the Court‘s holding prohibiting black 
men from being denied the right to sit on a jury).  Furthermore, after women were finally 
permitted to serve on juries, states imposed additional requirements that served to prohibit 
and discourage female participation.  J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131–32. 
6 See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309 (―And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored 
man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has 
expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in 
other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?‖).  But see Barbara D. 
Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection:  Whose Right is It, Anyway?, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 725, 728–36 (1992) (recognizing the notion that race discrimination in jury 
selection violates a defendant‘s equal protection rights, but contending that no justification 
exists to support this proposition). 
7 See Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 937 (Miss. 2007) (acknowledging that race-based 
discrimination continues to occur during jury selection despite the Supreme Court‘s 
attempt to end this discriminatory practice); Shaila Dewan, Study Finds Blacks Blocked from 
Southern Juries, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A14 (discussing a recently published study 
finding widespread race discrimination in jury selection); Dirk Olin, One Angry Man:  The 
Lament of the Peremptorily Challenged, SLATE, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/ 
2111247/ (discussing one man‘s experience being peremptorily challenged, allegedly due 
to his race-gender identity, and asserting that the use of peremptory challenges is ―little 
more than an invitation to judge-approved jury rigging.‖). 
8 See infra Part II.C (describing the difficulty that courts face when considering 
objections to peremptory challenges allegedly based on the potential juror‘s race-gender 
identity). 
9 See infra Part II.A (outlining the evolution of the law as it relates to peremptory 
challenges).  This author uses the terms ―peremptory challenge‖ and ―peremptory strike‖ 
interchangeably. 
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addressed claims of race-gender-based discrimination in employment 
and jury selection.10  Next, Part III analyzes the approaches courts have 
used when determining whether equal protection tolerates race-gender-
based peremptory challenges.11  Finally, this Note advocates that states 
should prohibit race-gender-based challenges and proposes a model 
state statute easing the burden for litigants objecting to allegedly 
discriminatory peremptory strikes.12 
II.  BACKGROUND OF RACE-GENDER IDENTITY AND THE LAW 
A discussion of whether peremptory challenges may be based on a 
potential juror‘s race-gender identity requires an understanding of the 
history of race and gender in jury selection.  Part II.A of this Note 
describes the jury selection process and the United States Supreme 
Court‘s attempts, thus far, to ensure that peremptory challenges are not 
exercised in violation of equal protection.13  As a source of comparison, 
Part II.B examines the courts‘ experiences addressing claims of race-
gender discrimination in employment and Part II.C highlights the 
challenges that courts have faced when addressing similar claims during 
jury selection.14 
A. Jury Selection, Peremptory Challenges, and Equal Protection 
The jury selection process begins by summoning potential jurors to 
sit on the venire.15  Once the venire is assembled, litigants engage in voir 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II.B (chronicling the caselaw development regarding race-gender-based 
discrimination in employment); infra Part II.C (identifying the way courts have handled 
allegations of race-gender-based discrimination during jury selection). 
11 See infra Part III (articulating the problems with different approaches that courts have 
taken when determining whether to deem race-gender groups cognizable). 
12 See infra Part IV (proposing a model state statute). 
13 See infra Part II.A (examining equal protection analysis as applied to peremptory 
challenges). 
14 See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of Title VII jurisprudence relating to 
race-gender discrimination); infra Part II.C (surveying the approaches that courts have 
taken in regards to peremptory challenges based on the combination of race and gender). 
15 JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 119 (indicating that the group of individuals summoned to 
the courthouse from which the trial jury is selected may be referred to as the jury pool, the 
array, venires, or talesmen).  Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―venire‖ as ―[a] panel of 
persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the jurors are to be chosen.‖  
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1694 (9th ed. 2009).  The word ―venire‖ literally means ―you are 
called to come.‖  JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 49 (1988).  The Federal Jury 
Selection and Service Act of 1968 governs the creation of the jury venire in federal courts.  
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (2006).  Additionally, the Sixth Amendment requires that the 
venire reflect a fair cross-section of the community.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 
(1975); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (identifying the analysis to be 
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dire, the process of questioning potential jurors.16  After voir dire, 
potential jurors are excused for hardship, cause, or through the use of a 
peremptory challenge.17  Peremptory challenges are meant to aid in the 
selection of an impartial jury by permitting parties to excuse potential 
jurors from the venire, whom they fear may favor the opposing party, 
                                                                                                             
applied in determining whether the fair cross-section requirement has been violated).  
Although the fair cross-section requirement applies only to criminal cases, civil trials are 
also affected by the requirement because governments use the same jury lists for civil and 
criminal trials.  JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 119.  The Supreme Court has declined to extend 
the fair cross-section requirement beyond the jury pool or venire.  See Holland v. Illinois, 
493 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1990) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section 
requirement does not extend to the petit jury).  See generally Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution 
Effect:  Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 
83 (2004) (offering an overview of the fair cross-section requirement). 
16 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009).  Black‘s law dictionary defines ―voir 
dire‖ as ―[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide 
whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.‖  Id.  The voir dire process 
is constitutionally required in criminal cases in order to assure that the chosen jurors are 
impartial to the case.  JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 129.  Voir dire also helps parties uncover 
actual or implied bias that may become a basis for a peremptory challenge.  J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994); see also JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE 
AND JURY SELECTION:  GAIN AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING YOUR JURY (2005) 
(exploring the deeper significance of nonverbal cues such as body movement, position, 
orientation, eye contact, shrugs, facial expressions, word choice, speed of speech, and tone 
of voice). 
17 JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 134–35, 139.  Courts may excuse jurors from jury duty if 
requiring the juror to participate will impose undue hardship on the juror.  See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 1866(c) (permitting the court to excuse a juror for undue hardship or extreme 
inconvenience); id. § 1869(j) (defining ―undue hardship‖).  The Federal Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968 defines ―undue hardship‖ as 
great distance, either in miles or traveltime, from the place of holding 
court, grave illness in the family or any other emergency which 
outweighs in immediacy and urgency the obligation to serve as a juror 
when summoned, or any other factor which the court determines to 
constitute an undue hardship or to create an extreme inconvenience to 
the juror; and in addition, in situations where it is anticipated that a 
trial or grand jury proceeding may require more than thirty days of 
service, the court may consider, as a further basis for temporary 
excuse, severe economic hardship to an employer which would result 
from the absence of a key employee during the period of such service. 
Id.  A juror who exhibits partiality may be challenged for cause.  JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET 
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 976 (Revised 9th ed., Thomson/West 2008) 
(1968).  In contrast, peremptory challenges permit a party to remove a potential juror 
without offering proof of partiality.  Id.; see BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 161–62 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining peremptory challenge as ―[o]ne of a party's limited number of challenges that do 
not need to be supported by a reason unless the opposing party makes a prima facie 
showing that the challenge was used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex‖); 
cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (noting that the ―essential nature‖ of the 
peremptory challenge is the fact that it may be exercised without explanation). 
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without explaining their decision.18  The challenge, however, is not 
limitless.  Striking a juror because of their race, ethnicity, or gender 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.19  
In general, equal protection demands that courts review classifications 
on the basis of race or gender with heightened scrutiny.20  The Supreme 
Court has held that discrimination on the basis of race or gender in the 
context of jury selection cannot withstand such scrutiny.21  
Consequently, lower courts are left with a legal quandary, as they are 
                                                 
18 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (opining that peremptory 
challenges are valuable because they help to ensure the selection of a fair jury by 
permitting parties to ―eliminat[e] extremes of partiality‖) (citing Holland v. Illinois, 496 
U.S. 474, 484 (1990)); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (―[The] 
sole purpose [of the peremptory challenge] is to permit litigants to assist the government in 
the selection of an impartial trier of fact.‖); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (explaining that in 
addition to eliminating extremes of partiality, peremptory challenges help to ―satisfy the 
appearance of justice‖) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
19 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of 
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 
(1991) (plurality opinion) (analyzing the trial court‘s determination that the prosecutor did 
not discriminate against Latinos, thus applying Batson‘s framework to ethnicity-based 
challenges); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits prosecutors from peremptorily challenging potential jurors because of 
their race); see also Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 856 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) 
(explaining that courts have used the terms race, ethnicity, and national origin 
interchangeably).  These limitations were imposed to comply with the demands of equal 
protection.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No state shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖).  Although on its face the amendment 
only applies to the states, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause applies 
to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
20 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (emphasizing that in order for 
a state to discriminate on the basis of gender, it must offer an ―exceedingly persuasive‖ 
justification); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1967) (explaining that equal application of 
a statute prohibiting interracial marriage would not alter the heavy burden of justification 
that a state must provide in order to discriminate on the basis of race).  The extent of the 
justification that the government must set forth depends on the nature of the class that the 
government wants to distinguish.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 618–23 (2d 
ed. 2005).  Laws that distinguish between individuals on the basis of race are subject to 
strict scrutiny.  Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.  Thus, the government must demonstrate that the 
means are ―narrowly tailored‖ to achieve a ―compelling government interest.‖  Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).  Laws that discriminate on the basis of 
gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (explaining that the 
State must show that classifications based on gender serve ―important governmental 
objectives‖ and the means are ―substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives‖) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)); see also 
Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:  Finding Our Place; Asserting Our Rights, 
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 39 (1989) (analyzing whether heightened scrutiny should be 
applied to black women as a discrete group). 
21 See infra note 51 and accompanying text (expanding the prohibition of race-based 
peremptory challenges to gender-based peremptory challenges). 
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responsible for determining whether unexplained peremptory 
challenges are actually based on protected aspects of jurors‘ identities.22  
Because of the inherent difficulty in making this determination, the use 
of peremptory challenges elicits concern that they will be exercised in a 
discriminatory fashion, subsequently harming everyone involved.23  
Many commentators who share this fear advocate abolition of the 
challenge.24  While states are free to eliminate it, the actions of many state 
                                                 
22 See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text (discussing the current three-prong test 
most courts apply when litigants object to the exercise of a peremptory challenge). 
23 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140–42 (describing the harm caused by discrimination in jury 
selection).  First, litigants are harmed when discrimination occurs during jury selection 
because it increases the risk that prejudice will affect the entire trial.  Id. at 140.  Also, the 
community suffers when discrimination enters jury selection because it causes the public to 
lose confidence in the justice system.  Id.  Furthermore, striking jurors from the jury because 
of their race or gender sends the message that the juror is inferior, thus attacking their 
dignity.  Id. at 141–42; cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 n.8 (―By compromising the representative 
quality of the jury, discriminatory selection procedures make ‗juries ready weapons for 
officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered among 
unpopular or inarticulate minorities.‘‖) (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945)); 
Underwood, supra note 6, at 726–27 (asserting that the injury caused by race discrimination 
in jury selection is primarily the negative effect such discrimination has on the excluded 
juror); Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection:  A Continuing Legacy, E.J.I. REP. (Equal 
Justice Initiative, Montgomery, Ala.), June 2010, at 28–34 (describing the experiences of 
various people of color who were excused from jury service through the exercise of a 
litigant‘s peremptory challenge). 
 The fear that peremptory challenges will be used to discriminate against potential 
jurors based on their race, gender, or ethnicity is not unfounded.  Jack McMahon, for 
example, became infamous in the legal community for his statements in a 1986 
Philadelphia District Attorney training video where he recommended the use of race- and 
gender-based stereotypes in an attempt to find ―jurors that are unfair and likely to 
convict.‖  Jack McMahon, Fear of a Black Jury, HARPER‘S BAZAAR, July 2000, at 27 
[hereinafter McMahon, Fear].  McMahon advocated the use of race, gender, and race-
gender stereotypes as a guide for exercising peremptory challenges.  Id. at 26–29.  For 
example, McMahon stated, ―Black women are very bad.  There‘s an antagonism.  I guess 
maybe they‘re down-trodden in two respects—they‘re women and they‘re blacks—and 
they want to take it out on somebody, and you don‘t want it to be you.‖  Id. at 28; see also 
Jack McMahon, Jury Rigging Laid Bare, HARPER‘S BAZAAR, June 1997, at 21 [hereinafter 
McMahon, Laid Bare] (―If you're going to take blacks, you want older black men and 
women, particularly men. Older black men are very good.‖).  Race-, gender-, or race-
gender-based discrimination is not always so overt, which only adds to the inherent 
difficulty of uncovering such discrimination.  See DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
STEREOTYPING 293–94 (Kurt W. Fischer, E. Tory Higgins, Marcia Johnson & Walter Mischel 
eds., Guilford Press 2004) (discussing subtle forms of discrimination that may not be 
consciously realized by the person exhibiting the discrimination).  Furthermore, 
stereotypes that describe individuals based on a combination of categories are often much 
richer than stereotypes that describe individuals based on one overarching category.  See id. 
at 80–83 (discussing attributes of ―compound categories,‖ or the way people identify others 
by using two or more categories, such as ―gay male athlete‖ or ―black female lawyer‖). 
24 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (advocating abolition of the 
peremptory challenge); Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) 
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courts and the United States Supreme Court illustrate that it is unlikely 
the peremptory challenge will be abolished.25 
                                                                                                             
(Meyers, J., concurring) (asserting that the time has come to abolish the peremptory 
challenge).  Judge Meyers cites to decisions written by three other judges similarly 
concluding that peremptory challenges ought to be eliminated.  Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 861.  
One of these judges went so far as to ban all peremptory challenges in her courtroom.  Id.; 
see Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that 
peremptory challenges are unlawful and a waste of time).  But see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia explained: 
Not only is it implausible that such a permanent and universal feature 
of our jury-trial system is unconstitutional, but it is unlikely that its 
elimination would be desirable.  The peremptory challenge system has 
endured so long because it has unquestionable advantages. . . . [I]t is a 
means of winnowing out possible (though not demonstrable) 
sympathies and antagonisms on both sides, to the end that the jury 
will be the fairest possible.  In a criminal-law system in which a single 
biased juror can prevent a deserved conviction or a deserved acquittal, 
the importance of this device should not be minimized. 
Id. 
 Others have taken a middle-ground approach and call for modification of the Batson 
procedure.  See James A. Domini & Eric Sheridan, Batson Challenges and the Jury Project:  Is 
New York Ready to Eliminate Discrimination from Criminal Jury Selection?, 11 ST. JOHN‘S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 169, 187–89 (1995) (proposing that states abandon the use of peremptory 
challenges and adopt a revised system using challenges for cause); Brian W. Stoltz, 
Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge:  Letting Lawyers Enforce the Principles of Batson, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1047–54 (2007) (advocating the use of a peremptory block challenge where 
lawyers could preemptively ―block‖ the use of peremptory challenges against selected 
jurors and a juror who had been ―blocked‖ would automatically be placed on the jury if 
opposing counsel attempted to peremptorily strike the juror); Underwood, supra note 6, at 
772–73 (proposing an effort to regulate peremptory challenges rather than abolish them). 
25 People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 783 (Ill. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
expressed reservation about further limiting the use of peremptory challenges); Pfister v. 
State, 650 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (opining that the Court has shown concern 
regarding trial courts limiting parties‘ use of peremptory challenges post-Batson and J.E.B.); 
Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 938 (Mass. 2007) (explaining that the courts are not likely to 
prohibit peremptory challenges as a whole, regardless of the fact that race still appears to 
play a role in jury selection); Deana Kim El-Mallawany, Comment, Johnson v. California 
and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3333, 3335 (2006) (contending 
that the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005) and Miller-El 
v. Dredke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), illustrate that peremptory challenges ―are still valid features 
of the American jury trial‖); Jennifer Ross, Note, Snyder v. Louisiana:  Demand for Judicial 
Scrutiny of the Use of Peremptory Challenges, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL‘Y SIDEBAR 305, 
313 (2009) (asserting that the majority opinion in Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) 
suggests it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will consider abolishing peremptory 
challenges any time soon).  Regardless of whether the Supreme Court abolishes the 
challenge, individual states could do so because state law defines the right to exercise 
peremptory challenges in state courts and peremptory challenges are not essential to a fair 
trial or the selection of an impartial jury.  See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009) 
(―This Court has ‗long recognized‘ that ‗peremptory challenges are not of federal 
constitutional dimension.‘‖) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 
(2000)). 
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The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of race-
based peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.26  Petitioner Swain, an 
African American male, was convicted of rape by an all-white jury.27  Of 
the eight African Americans in the venire, six were struck by the 
prosecutor using peremptory challenges and two were exempt for other 
reasons.28  Although the Court recognized that discriminatory jury 
selection violates equal protection, the evidence presented in Swain‘s 
case was insufficient to prove discrimination.29  The Court rejected the 
possibility that a single case could ever offer sufficient evidence of an 
equal protection violation; rather, a litigant would need to prove that the 
prosecutor struck African Americans from the jury in ―case after case.‖30 
                                                 
26 380 U.S. 202, 209–24 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
27 Id. at 203, 205 (identifying the facts of Swain v. Alabama).  Justice Goldberg further 
described the details of the case, explaining that the petitioner was only nineteen years old 
and his punishment for the rape of a seventeen-year-old white female was death.  See id. at 
231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 205 (majority opinion).  The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was 
not the only issue relating to racial discrimination raised in the case.  Id.  Swain also 
claimed that discrimination was inherent in the selection of the venire.  Id.  The Court held, 
however, that Swain provided insufficient evidence to state a claim.  Id. at 206.  The dissent 
attempted to place Swain‘s allegations in context, explaining that despite the fact that 
African Americans constituted twenty-six percent of the population of Talladega County 
eligible for jury service, no African American had ever served on a jury.  See id. at 231–32 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (expressing disagreement with the majority for finding that Swain 
failed to carry his burden of proof in light of the fact that the venire selection method was 
discriminatory and peremptory challenges were employed in a race-based manner). 
29 Id. at 203–04 (majority opinion) (reiterating that it violates equal protection to deny 
individuals the right to serve on a jury because of their race); id. at 224 (holding that the 
evidence in this case was inadequate to establish an equal protection violation).  But see id. 
at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (disapproving of the majority opinion and emphasizing 
that the opinion ―creates additional barriers to the elimination of jury discrimination 
practices‖).  The dissent asserted that the defendant offered sufficient evidence to make a 
case for a violation of equal protection.  Id. at 232. 
30 Id. at 222–23 (majority opinion) (identifying the evidence required to establish an 
equal protection violation).  The Court explained it could not subject peremptory 
challenges to traditional equal protection standards because such a decision would 
completely change the nature of the challenge.  Id. at 221–22.  Nonetheless, a showing that 
no African Americans ever serve on juries due to a prosecutor‘s unrelenting use of 
peremptory challenges, regardless of the circumstances, may be sufficient to violate equal 
protection.  Id. at 223–24.  Although the Court recognized that no jury in the county had 
included an African American juror during the fifteen years prior to Swain, the evidence 
offered by the defendant in this case was still insufficient.  Id. at 226.  Twenty-one years 
later, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court would describe Swain‘s requirement that the 
defendant prove the prosecutor violated equal protection by establishing the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges over time as a ―crippling burden.‖  See Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1986) (opining that Swain left peremptory challenges 
―largely immune from constitutional scrutiny‖). 
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The Court revisited Swain in Batson v. Kentucky.31  In Batson, the 
prosecutor peremptorily struck all black males from the venire and an 
all-white jury tried and convicted the defendant.32  The Court held that 
this evidence, consisting of only the prosecutor‘s actions in this case, 
could be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of race 
discrimination.33  In essence, Batson reaffirmed Swain‘s principle that 
striking jurors because of their race violates equal protection.34  The 
Court, however, rejected Swain‘s burdensome evidentiary requirements 
and set forth a three-prong test to be applied when a party objects to a 
peremptory challenge.35 
After a party objects to a peremptory challenge, the objecting party 
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful 
                                                 
31 Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate equal 
protection).  The defendant in Batson, an African American male, was indicted on charges 
of burglary and receipt of stolen goods.  Id. at 82.  After the Supreme Court heard Batson‘s 
case, Batson pled guilty to burglary and served a five-year sentence.  Kay Stewart, ―Good‖ 
Reversal Followed ―Unfair‖ Trial, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Nov. 6, 2005, http://www. 
courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051106/NEWS01/511060406.  When 
asked what Batson thought about his Supreme Court case, Batson explained, ―It‘s so old, 
they ought to let it go.‖  Id. 
32 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83 (describing the prosecution‘s use of peremptory challenges).  The 
judge explained that parties can use peremptory challenges to ―strike anybody they want 
to.‖  Id. 
33 Id. at 100 (remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration of the issue).  
Not all of the Justices were convinced that race-based strikes violate equal protection.  See 
id. at 137–38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Rehnquist stated the following: 
In my view, there is simply nothing ‗unequal‘ about the State‘s using 
its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases 
involving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also used to 
exclude whites in cases involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases 
involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian 
defendants, and so on.  This case-specific use of peremptory challenges 
by the State does not single out blacks, or members of any other race 
for that matter, for discriminatory treatment.  Such use of peremptories 
is at best based upon seat-of-the-pants instincts, which are 
undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many cases be 
hopelessly mistaken.  But as long as they are applied across-the-board 
to jurors of all races and nationalities, I do not see—and the Court most 
certainly has not explained—how their use violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Id. 
34 Id. at 91 (majority opinion).  The Batson Court quoted Justice Frankfurter and 
emphasized that ―[a] person‘s race simply ‗is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.‘‖  Id. at 87 
(quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
35 Id. at 93 (holding that contrary to the decision in Swain, a single case could provide 
sufficient evidence to establish an equal protection violation); id. at 96–98 (identifying a 
procedure for courts to employ when the defendant objects to the prosecution‘s use of 
allegedly discriminatory peremptory strikes); see also infra notes 36–49 and accompanying 
text (discussing Batson‘s three-prong test). 
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discrimination.36  In order to establish a prima facie case, the objecting 
party must show that the challenged juror is a member of a cognizable 
group and that this group membership was the basis for the strike.37  The 
court considers all relevant circumstances when determining whether 
the objecting party established a prima facie case.38  This may include, for 
example, statements made by the parties during voir dire or statistical 
evidence as to the racial composition of the jury.39  The objecting party 
                                                 
36 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
37 Id.; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (defining cognizable or 
―identifiable group‖ as one ―that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different 
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied‖); Murchu v. United States, 976 F.2d 50, 
54 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining what a defendant must show, for Batson purposes, ―to 
establish membership in a ‗cognizable group‘‖).  Membership is established by showing 
that (1) the group is definable and limited by some clearly identifiable 
factor, (2) a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences runs 
through the group, and (3) a community of interests exists among the 
group‘s members, such that the group‘s interest cannot be adequately 
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process.  A 
further ingredient of cognizability is that the group be one of the 
members of which are experiencing unequal, i.e. discriminatory, 
treatment, and needs protection from community prejudices. 
Id.; see also People v. Young, 105 P.3d 487, 541–42 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring) 
(comparing the definition of cognizable group applied in California courts with the 
definition applied by federal courts). 
38 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97. 
39 Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that statistical evidence is 
relevant when determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been 
established); Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 343 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
statements made during voir dire may be used to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination); People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246–47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 
(clarifying that a numerical argument, although relevant, cannot alone form the basis for a 
prima facie showing of discrimination).  One court has articulated the following 
considerations for determining whether a litigant has established a prima facie showing of 
discrimination: 
(1) racial identity between the [party exercising the peremptory 
challenge] and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes 
against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of 
peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons; (4) 
the level of African-American representation in the venire as compared 
to the jury; (5) the prosecutor‘s questions and statements [of the 
challenging party] during voir dire examination and while exercising 
peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American 
venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only 
common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and 
witnesses. 
People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 790 (Ill. 2006) (quoting People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 
650 (Ill. 1996)). 
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needs only to produce enough evidence of discrimination to permit the 
judge to draw an inference that discrimination occurred.40 
Notably, some courts have eliminated the prima facie requirement 
altogether and hold that a litigant satisfies this first step simply by 
raising the Batson challenge.41  These courts have found that elimination 
of this requirement simplifies the Batson inquiry and better protects the 
equal protection rights of defendants and jurors.42 
                                                 
40 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 173 (2005) (rejecting California‘s interpretation of 
the Batson standard requiring that the objecting party show that it is ―more likely than not‖ 
that the other party‘s peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias). 
41 See United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366, 368 (C.M.A. 1989) (eliminating the prima facie 
requirement in military courts); State v. Morales, 806 A.2d 902, 913 n.16 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2002) (explaining that the Connecticut Supreme Court has eliminated Batson‘s prima facie 
requirement at the first step of the burden shifting procedure); Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 
2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (identifying the requirements that a litigant must fulfill to move past 
the first step of the Batson procedure:  the challenger must timely object, state that the juror 
is a member of a distinct racial group, and request the court to ask opposing counsel to 
articulate a neutral reason for the strike); State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 940 (Mo. 1992) (en 
banc) (eliminating the prima facie requirement); State v. Edwards, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (S.C. 
2009) (―When one party strikes a member of a cognizable racial group or gender, the trial 
court must hold a Batson hearing if the opposing party requests one.‖); see also State v. 
Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1132–33 (Fla. 2008) (Cantero, J., dissenting) (noting that forty-six 
states follow the procedure as outlined by Batson, but Connecticut, Missouri, South 
Carolina, and Florida have chosen to follow Batson‘s procedure only in regards to steps two 
and three). 
42 See Moore, 28 M.J. at 368 (explaining that elimination of the prima facie requirement is 
beneficial because it simplifies the Batson process and makes the process fairer to the 
defendant); Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1126 (Pariente, J., concurring) (explaining that Florida‘s 
simplified Melbourne procedure has been beneficial overall); State v. Livingston, 220 S.W.3d 
783, 786–87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc) (―[T]he Missouri Supreme Court developed a 
more unitary procedure for the vindication of Batson claims that better protects the equal 
protection rights of a defendant and facilitates the efficient administration of justice in this 
state.‖).  In her concurring opinion, Judge Pariente noted that the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), illustrated that the Batson inquiry was meant to 
address suspicions that a challenge was discriminatory.  Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1127.  The 
Johnson Court set a low burden for litigants who object to a peremptory challenge.  Id.  
Florida‘s decision to lower the burden imposed by Batson‘s first step, even lower than the 
standard articulated by the Johnson Court, helps eliminate confusion created by imposing a 
high burden at the first step of Batson.  Id. at 1130. 
 Judge Pariente also addressed the concern that elimination of the prima facie 
requirement will result in an influx of superfluous objections to peremptory challenges.  Id. 
at 1127.  Although she conceded a problem could arise if litigants objected to all 
peremptory challenges, Judge Pariente explained that in her experience, she failed to see 
any such ―explosion‖ of frivolous objections caused by Florida‘s altered Batson procedure.  
Id. at 1127 n.2.  Furthermore, attorneys have an obligation as an officer of the court to avoid 
making frivolous objections to opposing counsel‘s peremptory challenges.  Id. at 1127.  The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from making needless objections.  
See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) (prohibiting a lawyer from asserting an 
issue in a proceeding unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so); MODEL RULES OF 
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If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the proponent 
of the challenge must offer a neutral justification for it.43  The explanation 
does not need to be as thorough as one offered to justify a challenge for 
cause, but the proponent must do more than merely state that the juror‘s 
membership in a protected group was not a factor.44  Currently, the 
courts are divided as to whether a Batson violation is established if the 
proponent of the challenge offers an impermissible justification along 
with permissible justifications.45  For example, if a litigant claims that a 
juror‘s age (a permissible justification) and race (an impermissible 
justification) formed the basis for the strike, some courts hold that the 
impermissible justification ―taints‖ the entire challenge, therefore ending 
the Batson inquiry and finding a per se Batson violation.46  Other courts 
                                                                                                             
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2008) (asserting that a lawyer may not knowingly disobey an 
obligation set by the court). 
43 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
44 Id. at 97, 98.  The Supreme Court has stated ―implausible or fantastic justifications may 
(and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.‖  Purkett v. 
Elem., 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam).  Courts have held a wide variety of 
justifications to be race- or gender-neutral for purposes of a Batson challenge.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Meza-Gonzales, 394 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the trial court‘s 
determination that the prosecutor‘s asserted reason for using a peremptory challenge to 
strike the only racial minority from the venire—that the juror had brightly colored 
fingernails and was a social worker—was race-neutral); United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 
1245, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding the trial court‘s determination that the prosecutor‘s 
assertion that she was trying to empanel ―born-and-bred District of Columbia resident[s]‖ 
was sufficiently race-neutral). 
45 Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(considering whether a peremptory challenge based partially on a potential juror‘s race, 
along with an additional factor, violates equal protection).  Judge Johnson recognized a 
split in authority in the Texas criminal appellate courts, federal courts, and other state 
courts, as to whether a peremptory challenge is valid if it is based, in part, on race.  Id. at 
868–69.  It seems as though the Supreme Court could have answered this question in 
Snyder v. Louisiana, but the Court did not reach the question as to whether the traditional 
dual motivation test applies to peremptory challenges.  See 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008).  Rather, 
the Court explained that it was ―enough to recognize that a peremptory strike shown to 
have been motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained 
based on any lesser showing by the prosecution.‖  Id.  The Court left unanswered the 
question of what constitutes a ―lesser showing.‖  If any permissible justification is 
considered a lesser showing, then essentially the ―tainted‖ approach would apply. 
46 Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 869 (Johnson, J., dissenting).  For a list of the courts adopting the 
―tainted‖ approach, see James R. Gadwood, Note, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down:  
JuryQuest in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 301 nn.74–77 (2008) (citing Sockwell v. 
State, 675 So. 2d 38, 40–41 (Ala. 1995); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); 
Robinson v. United States, 890 A.2d 674, 681 (D.C. 2006); Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994); McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ind. 2004); Payton v. 
Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998); Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991) 
(per curiam), abrogated in part by Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 252–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002) (en banc); State v. Jagodinsky, 563 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)). 
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apply a mixed motive or dual motivation analysis and attempt to 
determine whether the juror would have been struck based solely on the 
permissible justification.47 
Finally, if the proponent sets forth a neutral basis for the strike, the 
trial court must determine whether the challenger has shown purposeful 
discrimination.48  Due to the inevitable fact that this determination often 
depends on the demeanor of the attorney exercising the challenge, 
appellate courts defer to the trial court‘s determinations regarding the 
third prong, absent exceptional circumstances.49 
Until 1994, the Supreme Court had only applied Batson to cases 
involving race-based challenges.50  This changed, however, in J.E.B. v. 
                                                 
47 Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 869 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Russell D. Covey, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Batson:  Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. 
REV. 279, 346–47 (2007) (arguing against application of a Title VII mixed motive analysis to 
Batson‘s second prong).  Covey notes that the current trend among courts is to adopt a dual 
motivation approach.  Covey, supra, at 300–01 (citing cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits adopting a dual motivation approach).  See generally Kurtis 
A. Kemper, J.D., Annotation, Adoption and Application of ―Tainted‖ Approach or ―Dual 
Motivation‖ Analysis in Determining Whether Existence of Single Discriminatory Reason for 
Peremptory Strike Results in Automatic Batson Violation When Neutral Reasons Also Have Been 
Articulated, 15 A.L.R. 6TH 319 (2006) (identifying cases adopting or applying both tainted 
and dual motivation analysis).  Courts applying ―mixed motive analysis‖ adopted this 
analysis from Title VII employment cases.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973) (articulating the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); infra notes 
66–69 and accompanying text (describing the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 
procedure).  In those cases, courts have had to consider whether, and to what extent, a 
protected criterion may be a factor in the employer‘s decision.  See Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining that a defendant may 
avoid liability for discrimination if it can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it 
would have taken the same action even if the discriminatory factor was not considered).  
Notably, the Price Waterhouse decision has been superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
which clarifies that an employer cannot avoid liability by showing its actions would have 
been the same without the discriminatory motive.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) 
(clarifying the causation requirements under Title VII). 
48 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (discussing the final step of Batson‘s 
burden shifting procedure). 
49 Id. (―We have recognized that these determinations of credibility and demeanor lie 
‗peculiarly within a trial judge‘s province‘ . . . .‖) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 365 (1992) (plurality opinion)).  In Snyder, however, the Court illustrated that 
deference to the trial court is not always appropriate.  See id. at 479 (explaining that, in this 
case, there was no reason to defer to the trial judge‘s decision because the judge failed to 
make any specific findings regarding the courtroom demeanor of the challenged juror and 
the judge did not consider the challenge until many other jurors had been questioned). 
50 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1994) (examining the history of race-based 
challenges).  Not surprisingly, some members of the legal community did not agree with 
the Batson decision, even though its command was limited to race at this point.  See 
McMahon, Fear, supra note 23, at 26–29 (noting that one Philadelphia District Attorney, Jack 
McMahon, taught new district attorneys techniques to avoid Batson‘s requirements).  
McMahon described the case of Batson v. Kentucky as follows: 
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Alabama.51  In J.E.B., the State was alleged to have used its peremptory 
challenges to strike male jurors from the venire, solely because they were 
men.52  Interestingly, the Court began its analysis by reviewing the 
history of discrimination against women and comparing it to the history 
of discrimination against African Americans.53  Next, the Court 
                                                                                                             
I‘m sure you‘re all familiar with Batson v. Kentucky.  It‘s the case where 
the guy was convicted . . . by an all-white jury because the prosecutor 
had struck all blacks.  They ruled that it was not due process.  In the 
future, we‘re all going to have to be aware of that, and the best way to 
avoid any problems is to protect yourself.  My advice is that when you 
do have a black jury, question them at length.  And mark something 
down that you can articulate at a later time if something happens, 
because only after a prima facie showing can the trial judge order you 
to show why you‘re not striking them on a racial basis. 
Id. at 29.  McMahon was highly criticized and eventually reprimanded for teaching other 
lawyers how to avoid Batson‘s command.  See Michael Janofsky, Under Siege, Philadelphia’s 
Criminal Justice System Suffers Another Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1997, at A14. 
51 See 511 U.S. at 129 (―We hold that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for 
juror competence and impartiality.‖). 
52 Id.  The Court noted that the petit venire included ten male jurors and the State used 
nine peremptory strikes to remove males from the venire.  Id.  The trial court, however, 
rejected the respondent‘s objection to the use of the peremptory challenges, explaining that 
Batson only applied to race-based challenges and not to challenges based on gender.  Id.  
The appellate court affirmed the decision and the Alabama Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.  Id. at 129–30. 
53 Id. at 135–37.  The Court described the historical justifications for the exclusion of 
women from the jury.  Id. at 132–33.  In general, women were believed to need protection 
from the ―depravity of trials.‖  Id. at 132.  Society felt that women were ―too fragile and 
virginal to withstand the polluted courtroom atmosphere.‖  Id.  The Court further stated 
that even after women were emancipated, courts permitted states to enact laws requiring a 
woman to volunteer to serve on a jury rather than impose mandatory jury service on 
women, as it did with men.  Id. at 134.  The Court rejected these notions as outdated and 
antiquated and further compared women‘s history of discrimination to the history of 
discrimination against African Americans.  Id. at 135–36.  For example, the Court explained 
that both slaves and white women were prohibited from ―hold[ing] office, serv[ing] on 
juries, or bring[ing] suit in their own names.‖  Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion)).  In comparison, even after African American males 
were given the right to vote, women were forced to wait nearly half a century until they 
were granted that right.  Id. at 136.  Stereotypes about women continue to pervade 
American society today, as illustrated in the way the media has portrayed women in 
movies and television shows.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 344–47 (describing the 
selective and stereotypic presentation of women in the media).  Schneider notes the 
following examples of the stereotypical portrayal of women in the media: 
In commercials, women represent domestic products more often than 
do men; males are more likely to use reasoned arguments for product 
use, to have more authority, and to appear as spokespersons for more 
expensive products. . . . In music videos men are presented as 
aggressive and women as sexually suggestive, provocatively clothed, 
subservient, and the targets of sexual advances. . . . Women patients in 
medical advertisements tend to have pleasant expressions, whereas 
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considered whether the use of gender-based challenges advances the 
State‘s sole interest in permitting peremptory challenges:  the selection of 
an impartial jury.54  The Court determined that gender-based challenges 
do not assist in the selection of an impartial jury and are likely to 
generate the same harms that race-based challenges create.55  Thus, the 
Court held that challenging jurors because of their gender violates equal 
protection.56 
Although Batson plainly articulates one method of addressing 
discrimination in jury selection, defining the groups that are protected 
from discrimination has proved troublesome.57  Clearly, litigants can no 
                                                                                                             
male patients are more serious; this difference may contribute to the 
alleged tendency of physicians to take female complaints less seriously 
than males. 
Id. at 345–46 (citations omitted).  Notably, the J.E.B. Court added that even if males had not 
suffered a past history of discrimination, it is unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis 
that he or she holds a particular view because of their gender.  See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141–42 
(explaining that the right to nondiscriminatory jury selection extends to both women and 
men). 
54 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8.  Interestingly, J.E.B. was a case involving child support 
and the respondent argued that gender discrimination should be permitted in this type of a 
case because men may relate more with a man in a paternity action and women may be 
more receptive to the statements made by the mother of the child.  See id. at 137–38.  The 
Court rejected this argument.  Id. at 138.  Many recent studies have confirmed that the 
Court‘s decision to reject the argument was correct, as these studies show that jury verdicts 
and jurors‘ race, gender, or socioeconomic status are unrelated.  See SEAN G. OVERLAND, 
THE JUROR FACTOR:  RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICA‘S CIVIL COURTS 11 (Melvin I. Ruofsky 
ed., LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2009) (explaining that despite popular belief that the 
racial or gender composition of the jury affects the jury‘s verdict, most research on the issue 
has proved otherwise).  But see JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at xxi (noting that some 
commentators have suggested that jury selection determines the outcome of the case).  For 
example, one professor has stated ―[a] familiar wisecrack is that in England the trial begins 
when the jury is selected; in America, that is when the trial is over.‖  Id. 
55 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140–42 (describing the harm stemming from gender 
discrimination as affecting the litigants, the community, and struck jurors).  The Court 
explained that if it were to accept the argument that women are more sympathetic to 
certain arguments than men, it would be basing its decision on ―the very stereotype the law 
condemns.‖  Id. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).  Even if there 
were some truth to the stereotype, the Constitution prohibits the State from relying on 
impermissible stereotypes.  Id. at 139 n.11.  The Court further explained that if it permitted 
discrimination on the basis of gender, litigants might use gender as a proxy for race 
discrimination.  Id. at 145.  In many cases involving gender-based peremptory challenges, 
the excused jurors were female and members of a racial minority.  Id. at 145 n.18.  This 
illustrates that race and gender are overlapping categories, necessitating a prohibition on 
the use of gender-based peremptory challenges.  Id. at 145. 
56 Id. at 130–31. 
57 See infra Part II.C (illustrating the uncertainty surrounding whether race-gender-based 
groups are cognizable for purposes of Batson).  Courts have been asked to deem a wide 
variety of groups cognizable.  Cf. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994) (denying 
certiorari in a case questioning whether jurors may be struck because of their religion); 
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longer rely on race- or gender-based stereotypes when exercising strikes, 
but it remains in dispute as to whether race-gender identity may form 
the basis of a peremptory challenge.58  Before examining this debate, this 
Note first reviews the treatment that race-gender identity has received in 
the employment law context.59 
B. Race, Gender, and Title VII 
Peremptory challenges are only one area of law in which courts have 
developed a means to uncover discrimination.60  For example, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to discriminate against 
any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 
in employment and other workplace conduct.61  Title VII jurisprudence is 
helpful to consider because the Batson Court adopted its three-prong test 
from Title VII caselaw.62  Also, Title VII and Batson both prohibit certain 
actions from being taken when they are based on specific aspects of a 
person‘s identity, but they permit the same actions to be taken when 
                                                                                                             
United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (challenging blind jurors does 
not violate equal protection because the prosecutor planned to use video evidence); Rico v. 
Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding Italian Americans could be a 
cognizable group); United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 
U.S. 1044 (2000) (challenging individuals with a disability is permissible because disability 
may be a legitimate basis on which to measure juror capability); United States v. Santiago-
Martinez, 58 F.3d 422, 422–23 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding obese individuals do not constitute a 
cognizable group); People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 692 (Cal. 1983) (holding that ―guilt phase 
includables,‖ a group of individuals who would vote automatically against the death 
penalty, is not a cognizable group); State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1140 (N.J. 2004) 
(explaining that Batson has been extended to challenges based on religious affiliation, but 
distinguishing religious affiliation from religious beliefs); Courtney A. Waggoner, 
Comment, Peremptory Challenges and Religion:  The Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court 
Opinion, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 326–27 (2004) (calling for the Supreme Court to determine 
whether religion is a protected status for purposes of Batson). 
58 See infra Part II.C (outlining various courts‘ treatment of race-gender-based strikes). 
59 See infra Part II.B (exploring the history of claims of race-gender-based discrimination 
in the employment setting). 
60 See supra Part II.A (discussing peremptory challenge jurisprudence). 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000) (prohibiting certain forms of discrimination in 
employment).  In enacting this legislation, Congress attempted to remove arbitrary barriers 
to employment.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).  ―Congress 
did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person regardless of 
qualifications. . . . [T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he 
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.‖  
Id. at 800 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)).  See generally 
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON & IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND 
LITIGATION III-1 to III-183 (2009) (offering a thorough overview of Title VII). 
62 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) (explaining that Title VII cases set 
forth the prima facie burden of proof rules that the Court applies in Batson). 
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based on permissible considerations.63  Thus, Title VII is a natural source 
of comparison.64 
When a plaintiff files suit under Title VII and offers indirect evidence 
of discrimination, the court applies the McDonnell Douglas test, a three-
step burden shifting procedure.65  First, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination.66  To establish a prima facie case, the 
plaintiff must show he or she:  (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) 
qualified for the position for which the plaintiff applied; (3) was rejected; 
and (4) the position remained open or was filled by someone not in the 
plaintiff‘s protected class.67  Once a prima facie case has been established, 
                                                 
63 See Covey, supra note 47, at 331–32 (describing the justifications supporting a 
comparison of Title VII to peremptory challenge jurisprudence).  Title VII was enacted to 
prevent all forms of race discrimination, including subtle discrimination, from influencing 
employment decisions.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801 (―[I]t is abundantly 
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.‖).  This goal 
corresponds neatly to the application of equal protection to peremptory challenges because 
Batson and its progeny seek to prevent undisclosed race and gender discrimination from 
influencing jury selection.  See supra Part II.A (identifying the framework used to eliminate 
race- and gender-based challenges).  Furthermore, the text of Title VII does not explicitly 
state that race-gender groups are cognizable.  See § 2000e-2(a).  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has not explained whether race-gender groups are protected under Batson.  See infra 
notes 78–80 and accompanying text (describing one court‘s statutory analysis of Title VII 
and whether it permits race-gender claims).  The arguments supporting or criticizing the 
extension of Title VII to race-gender groups are similar to those offered when determining 
whether race-gender-based strikes are permissible.  See infra notes 78–80 and 
accompanying text (describing one court‘s reasons for recognizing race-gender 
discrimination in Title VII cases).  Title VII and the Batson procedure, however, have an 
obvious dissimilarity.  Title VII is statutory and the groups deemed protected are explicitly 
set forth in the text.  See § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ―race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin‖).  In contrast, Batson and its progeny place limits on 
peremptory challenges due to the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.  See supra Part 
II.A (describing the limitations that have been placed on peremptory challenges).  Another 
difference between Title VII and Batson is that Title VII reaches facially neutral practices 
that have a disparate impact on a protected group, whereas disparate impact is not enough 
to support a Batson challenge.  Compare Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 
991 (1988) (holding that disparate impact analysis applies to subjective and objective 
employment practices), with United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that disparate impact is not a proper basis for a Batson challenge and inevitably 
rejecting a claim that peremptorily striking teachers violates Batson because it has a 
disparate impact on women). 
64 See supra note 63 (describing why it is beneficial to consider Title VII when discussing 
issues regarding peremptory challenges). 
65 See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (outlining the McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting procedure); see also Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 
(1981) (clarifying the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting procedure). 
66 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the elements a plaintiff must 
prove in order to show purposeful discrimination in the employment setting). 
67 Id.  This burden is not meant to be onerous; the plaintiff must only prove these 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.  The elements that 
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the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a neutral reason for its 
actions.68  If the employer presents a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
justification, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
employer‘s proffered justification was pretext for a discriminatory 
motive.69 
                                                                                                             
the plaintiff must prove will necessarily vary depending on the facts of each case.  
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.  In theory, Title VII cases seem to require that 
the plaintiff prove that he or she is a member of a protected minority class or female.  See 
Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999) (―Indeed, if strictly 
applied, the prima facie test would eliminate all reverse discrimination suits.‖).  The courts, 
however, have not required that the plaintiff establish that his group membership, which is 
the basis for his claim, is also a group that has experienced a past history of discrimination.  
Id. (explaining that Title VII plaintiffs do not need to be members of a group that has 
suffered a history of past discrimination).  In fact, it appears that reverse discrimination 
claims, or allegations of discrimination against members of a traditionally privileged 
group, are on the rise.  Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same:  Applying a 
Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case 
Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 53–54 (1999) (explaining that more Americans believe 
white males are increasingly being discriminated against because of their race-gender 
identity and identifying statistics illustrating the growing number of reverse discrimination 
claims being filed); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 317 n.1 (explaining that members of 
racial minorities have prejudices about whites and whites are not the only people who 
discriminate against others on the basis of race).  In the summer of 2009, reverse 
discrimination claims garnered excessive media attention when the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), holding that the City of New 
Haven violated Title VII when it refused to certify the results of a promotion exam because 
the results were such that only white firefighters would have received promotions.  See 
Supreme Court to Rule on Firefighter Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 27, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31584071/ (describing the case as ―closely watched‖); 
Douglas S. Malan, A Long Journey to a Landmark Decision, CONN. L. TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2009, 
http://www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx?id=35862 (noting the intense media 
attention the case received).  In Ricci, the Court held that the City of New Haven would 
have been able to defend its decision only if the City could show it had a strong basis in 
belief that it would have been liable on a disparate impact theory if it certified the results.  
129 S. Ct. at 2664.  The evidence in this case was not sufficient to meet that standard.  Id. 
68 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (articulating the second step of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis).  The employer‘s burden is one of production.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55. 
69 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 (describing the third step of the McDonnell 
Douglas procedure).  The plaintiff always retains the burden of persuasion.  Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 256.  In order to meet her burden, the plaintiff may use direct evidence to establish 
that ―a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer.‖  Id.  Alternatively, the 
plaintiff may use indirect evidence to ―show[] that the employer‘s proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence.‖  Id.  The McDonnell Douglas Court described various factors that a 
plaintiff could set forth when offering proof that the justification was pretextual.  See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05.  This includes asking whether other employees 
were also terminated for engaging in the same or similar acts.  Id. at 804.  While employers 
may fire employees for actions such as participating in protests, they must do so equally to 
all employees.  Id.  The plaintiff may also set forth evidence regarding the employer‘s 
general treatment of the plaintiff and the employer‘s general practice regarding 
employment of racial minorities.  Id. at 804–05. 
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Over the years, the courts wrestled with how to apply this three-step 
procedure to Title VII cases involving allegations of race-gender 
discrimination.70  First, the courts had to decide whether a group based 
on race-gender identity could constitute a cognizable class.71  This was 
not the first time the courts were asked to determine whether Title VII 
addresses discrimination based on more than one aspect of a person‘s 
identity.  Previously, some courts adopted a ―sex-plus‖ analysis for 
addressing claims of discrimination based on a subsection of gender.72  
                                                 
70 See infra notes 71, 76–80 (recounting the plight of Title VII plaintiffs bringing race-
gender-based claims).  Issues arose, due to the fact that race and gender are overlapping 
categories, even before Title VII was signed into law.  See Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 10–
11 (describing the debates that occurred during the drafting of Title VII).  For example, 
when determining whether to add sex as a protected status under the bill, Representatives 
disagreed as to whether black women would be protected if race alone were included in 
the Act.  Id.  One Representative, concerned that black women would receive more rights 
than white women, stated, ―[I]f you do not add sex to this bill . . . you are going to try to 
take colored men and colored women and give them equal employment rights, and down 
at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at all.‖  Id. at 11 (citing 
E.E.O.C., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VI AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3218 
(1968)). 
71 DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 483–84 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(examining a case in which the district court held that black women could not bring a Title 
VII claim alleging discrimination based on their race-gender identity).  In DeGraffenreid, the 
trial court stated that permitting plaintiffs to bring race-gender-based claims would allow 
plaintiffs to create a ―super-remedy‖ that was not intended by the drafters of Title VII.  Id. 
at 483.  The appellate court noted that it did not entirely agree with the district court‘s 
decision not to recognize race-gender claims, but it affirmed the decision on the basis that 
the complaint failed to state a Title VII claim because the seniority system at issue was 
facially neutral.  Id. at 484; see also Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Women of Color and 
Employment Discrimination:  Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 
160–61 (1993) (discussing combined race-gender claims and Title VII); Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 148 (discussing 
the courts‘ failure to acknowledge race-gender identity); Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and 
Discrimination:  A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1463 (2009) (noting the 
difficulty courts have experienced when addressing complex bias claims). 
72 See Bryant v. Int‘l Schs. Servs, Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 573 n.18 (―A sex-plus problem arises 
whenever an employer adds a criterion or factor for one sex [e.g., marital status], which is 
not added for the other sex.‖) (citation omitted); cf. McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. 
Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (sex-plus-a woman with a disabled child); Arnett v. Aspin, 
846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (sex-plus-age); infra notes 73–74 (discussing Sprogis 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., another sex-plus case).  The case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 
is often credited with coining the term ―sex plus.‖  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 
416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., dissenting) (using the term ―sex plus‖ for the 
first time to describe discrimination on the basis of gender and an additional unprotected 
factor).  In Phillips, Ida Phillips filed suit alleging sex discrimination after she applied for a 
position with Martin Marietta Corp. and was told that the company would not consider 
female applicants who had pre-school age children.  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 
F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969).  The company would, however, consider male applicants with pre-
school age children.  Id.  In its defense, the company claimed it did not discriminate on the 
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For example, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit 
explained that an employer could not discriminate against married 
women, even though ―married individuals‖ do not constitute a 
protected class.73  Simply because the employer was not discriminating 
against all women (sex discrimination) did not mean that it had free 
reign to discriminate against married women (sex-plus-marriage).74  In 
                                                                                                             
basis of sex; rather, it only discriminated against women with pre-school age children.  Id. 
at 2–3.  The trial court granted defendant‘s motion for summary judgment based on 
evidence showing that Martin Marietta Corp. filled 75%–80% of the positions for which 
Phillips had applied with women and 70%–75% of the applicants were women.  Id. at 1, 2.  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and a petition for rehearing en banc was 
denied.  See Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1258 (denying petition for rehearing).  In his dissent from 
the denial of the rehearing en banc, Judge Brown criticized the majority‘s analysis.  See id. 
at 1260 (Brown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority‘s conclusion essentially creates 
an either/or test:  either the discrimination is based on sex only and is prohibited, or an 
additional criterion is added to gender and the discrimination is then permissible).  The 
Supreme Court eventually vacated and remanded the decision, concluding that the court 
should have analyzed this as a question of whether the policy reflected a bona fide 
occupational qualification, without commenting on Judge Brown‘s use of the term ―sex 
plus.‖  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
73 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971) (analyzing discrimination against married females).  
In Sprogis, a female stewardess alleged that she was fired because of her sex.  Id. at 1196.  
The airline company, United, had a policy that all stewardesses must be unmarried.  Id.  
The policy did not apply to stewards.  Id.  United argued that their policy did not draw a 
distinction between men and women, but rather it merely distinguished between 
individuals who were employed as stewardesses.  Id. at 1197.  The court rejected that 
argument and cited a determination by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
stating that even if the discrimination is directed only at a subsection of one gender, it is 
still discrimination on the basis of sex.  Id. at 1197–98. 
74 Id. at 1198 (―The effect of [Title VII] is not to be diluted because discrimination 
adversely affects only a portion of the protected class.‖).  The sex-plus analysis has not 
been adopted by the courts when applying traditional equal protection analysis.  See 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974) (applying rational basis review to a legislative 
classification based on pregnancy).  The Geduldig Court explained that discrimination based 
on pregnancy divided individuals into two groups:  pregnant women and non-pregnant 
persons.  Id.  Since women were on both sides of the equation, this did not constitute sex 
discrimination.  Id. at 496–97.  Geduldig was subsequently overruled by the enactment of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).  The Supreme Court relied on Geduldig in Bray v. Alexandria 
Women’s Health Clinic, where the Court considered whether the actions of a group aimed at 
preventing women‘s access to clinics that perform abortions demonstrated a form of sex-
based discrimination.  See Bray v. Alexandria Women‘s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269–70 
(1993) (holding that opposition to abortion cannot be considered sex-based discrimination).  
Bray has not been overturned.  The level of scrutiny to be applied when analyzing equal 
protection claims of combined race-gender discrimination has not explicitly been resolved 
by the courts and both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny have been advocated by 
commentators.  Compare Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 24–34, 35 (proposing strict scrutiny 
for discrimination against black women), with Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All Male Black 
Schools and the Equal Protection Clause:  A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 
2003, 2028 (1992) (advocating the use of intermediate scrutiny when analyzing 
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these early sex-plus cases, the ―plus‖ factor was an unprotected criterion, 
such as marital status or whether the individual had preschool-age 
children.75 
The judiciary eventually expanded the sex-plus doctrine to race-
gender groups.76  In Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly expanded the sex-plus doctrine 
to permit a black female to bring a claim alleging discrimination based 
on her sex-plus-race.77  The court first noted that the text of Title VII 
                                                                                                             
discrimination against African American females who are prevented from attending an all-
male, all-black school). 
75 See Arnett, 846 F. Supp at 1239 (explaining that sex-plus ―allows plaintiffs to bring a 
Title VII claim for sex discrimination if they can demonstrate that the defendant 
discriminated against a subclass of women (or men) based on either (1) an immutable 
characteristic or (2) the exercise of a fundamental right‖).  The Arnett court concluded that 
age is an immutable characteristic and upheld a sex-plus-age claim.  Id. at 1241; see also 
supra notes 72–74 (illustrating the traditional use of sex-plus analysis). 
76 Cf. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing a Title 
VII claim of race-plus-sex); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 
1984) (same); see also infra notes 77–80 (addressing the expansion of sex-plus analysis).  
Notably, in Judge Brown‘s dissent in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the first case to use 
the term ―sex-plus,‖ Judge Brown seemed to take for granted the fact that courts would 
prohibit discrimination based on sex plus a protected criterion.  See 416 F.2d at 1260 n.10 
(Brown, J., dissenting) (―Of course the ‗plus‘ could not be one of the other statutory 
categories of race, religion, national origin, etc.‖).  The sex-plus doctrine has been further 
extended beyond simply race-gender groups to encompass groups comprised of more than 
two categories.  See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n.16, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing the combination of race, gender, and national origin as a protected class under 
Title VII, consequently broadening sex-plus to a type of sex-plus-plus).  The Lam court 
explained that the lower court failed to recognize the type of discrimination at issue.  Id.  
The court opined, ―Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared 
neither by Asian men nor by white women.‖  Id. at 1562.  Thus, discrimination based on 
multiple categories of one‘s identity cannot not be accurately analyzed by dissecting the 
identity and treating it as separate claims of discrimination.  Id.  The court found that the 
lower court needed to determine whether Lam‘s employer discriminated on the basis of 
her combined identity, regardless of whether the employer discriminated on the basis of 
race or sex.  Id.  Not all courts have been willing to expand the sex-plus analysis beyond 
two categories.  See, e.g., Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (limiting the 
Jefferies analysis to the combination of two protected immutable traits).  Similarly, in Luce v. 
Dalton, the court refused to permit a combined discrimination claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (―ADEA‖).  166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. Cal. 1996) 
(declining to recognize claims of ―age-plus-religion‖ or ―age-plus-disability‖ 
discrimination under the ADEA).  In determining that the ADEA does not recognize ―age-
plus-religion‖ or ―age-plus-disability‖ discrimination, the court explained that Congress 
did not intend to permit plaintiffs to combine discrimination statutes.  Id.  Furthermore, 
discrimination based on criterion such as age or disability is fundamentally different than 
that based on race or gender; there are unique discriminatory biases against race-gender 
subgroups that are not faced by individuals based on other subgroup membership.  Id. 
77 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980).  In Jefferies, the court held that Jefferies, a black 
female, could bring a discrimination suit even if she could not prove discrimination on the 
basis of race or sex.  Id.  First, the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s holding that 
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includes the word ―or‖ when listing the protected classes, which means 
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination based on any or all of the 
classes described.78  Next, the court discussed the history of sex-plus 
jurisprudence and concluded that it would be ―beyond belief‖ for the 
courts to prohibit an employer from discriminating on the basis of sex 
plus a neutral factor but allow employers to discriminate on the basis of 
sex-plus-race.79  Additionally, the court noted that the recognition of 
race-gender subgroups is essential to remedying discrimination against 
black females.80 
Currently, the number of race-gender and other complex claims of 
discrimination are increasing.81  Nonetheless, complex discrimination 
                                                                                                             
Jefferies‘s claim of race discrimination failed because a black male was given the position to 
which Jefferies applied.  Id. at 1030.  Second, the trial court had determined that Jefferies‘s 
sex discrimination claim failed because females held sixteen of the thirty-six supervisory 
positions and one female was a field representative.  Id. at 1030–31.  The appellate court 
remanded the sex discrimination issue, finding that the trial court failed to undergo a 
proper legal analysis and made insufficient findings of fact.  Id. at 1031.  Third, the trial 
court never addressed Jefferies‘s claim of race-gender discrimination.  Id. at 1032.  The 
appellate court instructed the trial court to consider on remand whether Jefferies was 
discriminated against because of her race-gender identity.  Id. at 1034.  Also, when 
analyzing the race-gender claim, the trial court was instructed to consider only evidence 
pertaining to the number of black females hired or promoted.  Id.  The court was instructed 
to ignore evidence pertaining to the hiring or promotion of black males or white females 
because they are not within the plaintiff‘s protected class.  Id.  Thus, the court expanded 
sex-plus jurisprudence to permit claims of discrimination based on sex-plus-race.  Id. 
78 Id. at 1032 (examining the use of the word ―or‖ in the text of Title VII).  Also, the court 
explained that the House of Representatives rejected an amendment to Title VII that would 
have added the word ―solely‖ to the statute, evidencing an intent to extend protection to all 
combinations of protected categories.  Id. 
79 Id. at 1034.  The court explained that employers cannot discriminate against women 
with young children, but, technically, being a parent to a young child is a ―neutral‖ factor.  
Id.  In contrast, Title VII explicitly forbids the use of race as a criterion for employment.  Id.  
It would be illogical to prohibit discrimination based on sex and a neutral factor, but allow 
discrimination based on sex and race.  Id. 
80 Id. at 1034.  The expansion of protection to race-gender groups using the sex-plus 
analysis is not without its critics.  See Pamela J. Smith, Part II—Romantic Paternalism—The 
Ties that Bind:  Hierarchies of Economic Oppression that Reveal Judicial Disaffinity for Black 
Women and Men, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 181, 225 (1999) (explaining that the adoption of 
the sex-plus analysis still falls short of fully recognizing black women‘s experiences). 
81 Kotkin, supra note 71, at 1450–52.  The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (―E.E.O.C.‖) reports the number of discrimination charges filed each year and 
publishes them on the E.E.O.C. website.  See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2009, 
EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2010).  The E.E.O.C. organizes the charges by type of discrimination alleged, and 
notes that ―the number of total charges for any given fiscal year will be less than the total of 
the eight types of discrimination listed‖ because individuals may allege multiple forms of 
discrimination in their charge.  Id.  Professor Kotkin explains that overall ―there are 20 
percent more claims of discrimination than charges, and the percentage is increasing.‖  
Kotkin, supra note 71, at 1451. 
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claims fail more often than claims of discrimination based on a single 
ground.82  Minna J. Kotkin, a Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, 
explains that even though the McDonnell-Douglas procedure has been 
interpreted to permit plaintiffs to bring complex claims of employment 
discrimination, plaintiffs alleging complex forms of discrimination have 
a more difficult time demonstrating that the employer‘s neutral 
justification is pretext for discrimination.83  For example, a plaintiff may 
try to show that other similarly situated employees who are members of 
the plaintiff‘s class also experienced discrimination.84  This is more 
difficult for a plaintiff in a complex discrimination case because the 
group of individuals who are members of the plaintiff‘s class is likely to 
be smaller than it would be if the claim were race- or gender-based.85  
Professor Kotkin proposes that in order for complex claims of 
discrimination to prevail, additional evidence must be admitted 
regarding the alleged discrimination and courts must become cognizant 
of the stereotypes that form the basis for complex discrimination.86 
In the same way that courts have had to address race-gender 
discrimination in Title VII cases, the courts must now decide how to 
address race-gender discrimination in the context of jury selection.87  The 
next section of this Note outlines the growing debate as to whether race-
gender identity is a permissible basis for peremptory challenges.88 
C. Race-Gender Identity and Peremptory Challenges 
The courts have struggled to determine whether they should permit 
litigants to peremptorily strike potential jurors on the basis of the jurors‘ 
race-gender identity.89  This issue is not solely the courts‘ concern; 
                                                 
82 Id. at 1457–58. 
83 Id. at 1490–91. 
84 Id. at 1492. 
85 Id. at 1493.  Additionally, plaintiffs may try to show that a similarly situated employee 
from a different race-gender group received favorable treatment.  Id. at 1491.  In a race-
gender-based claim, the individual to whom the plaintiff is compared must not be a 
member of the plaintiffs race-gender group, racial group, or gender.  Id. at 1492.  Thus, it 
makes it easier for the employer to demonstrate that individuals who were not outside the 
plaintiff‘s race-gender group received favorable treatment, combating the plaintiff‘s 
allegation that individuals outside the plaintiff‘s race-gender group did receive favorable 
treatment.  Id. at 1491–92.  Professor Kotkin also asserts that merely applying an 
intersectional framework when analyzing Title VII cases does no more than restate the 
problem.  Id. at 1481. 
86 Id. at 1497. 
87 See infra Part II.C (reviewing caselaw regarding race-gender-based peremptory 
strikes). 
88 See infra Part II.C (examining the issue of race-gender discrimination). 
89 See infra Part II.C.1–2 and accompanying text (surveying cases discussing whether to 
recognize combinations of gender and racial groups).  Notably, courts have explicitly 
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members of the general public have questioned whether their personal 
identity consisting of their race and gender should be recognized and 
protected by the courts.90  Currently, some courts prohibit race-gender 
discrimination while others do not.91  The following subsection of this 
                                                                                                             
questioned whether combined race-gender groups are protected under Batson and J.E.B. for 
over fourteen years, unfortunately, without much response.  See Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 
807, 812 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (―[T]he 
issue of whether African-American men could constitute a Batson class likely is worthy of 
consideration in light of recent holdings that gender as well as race is an impermissible 
basis for peremptory challenges . . . .‖); see also United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1291 
n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (―[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that whether Batson applies to 
combined race-gender groups is a question that merits a determination at some 
point . . . .‖); Jean Montoya, ―What’s So Magic[al] About Black Women?‖ Peremptory Challenges 
at the Intersection of Race and Gender, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 369, 412 (1996) (advocating 
recognition of race-gender groups). 
90 See Olin, supra note 7 (describing his experience being called for jury duty in Newark 
and being excused from the jury by a litigant).  Olin implies that his racial and gender 
identity played a role in his excusal, further claiming that ―[d]iscrimination against middle-
aged white men raises no constitutional eyebrow.‖  Id.; see also Kevin Sack, Research Guided 
Jury Selection in Church Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2001, at A12.  Sack describes the 
trial of a former Ku Klux Klan member alleged to have been involved in a church bombing.  
Sack, supra at A12.  Sack emphasizes that the prosecution, with the guidance of a 
professional jury consultant, exercised its peremptory challenges in a way to create a jury 
that lacked white male jurors.  Id. 
91 See infra Part II.C.1–2 (identifying courts that have recognized or refrained from 
recognizing race-gender groups as protected from discrimination during litigants‘ exercise 
of peremptory challenges).  Not all jurisdictions have taken a stand on whether race-gender 
groups are protected for purposes of peremptory challenges.  See, e.g., Cooperwood v. 
Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the court has yet to address the 
issue of whether African American males constitute a cognizable group); Ross v. 
Mississippi, 16 So. 3d 47, 59 (Miss. App. 2009) (noting that the Mississippi courts have not 
yet determined whether race-gender identity is a cognizable group for purposes of the first 
step of the Batson procedure).  For example, in Ross v. Mississippi, Shirley Ross, an African 
American female, was convicted of aggravated assault for pouring grease and hot water on 
her husband.  16 So. 3d at 51–52.  Ross appealed on the basis that, among other claims, her 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because her counsel failed to object to the 
State‘s peremptory challenges of African American females.  Id. at 58–59.  Although the 
court held that Ross was barred from raising the issue, the appellate court noted in dicta 
that it noticed a discriminatory pattern on the basis of race and gender.  Id. at 59.  The court 
articulated the pattern as follows: 
[T]he State used four peremptory challenges to remove three black 
females from the venire, along with a white male.  The State tendered 
six black males, one white male, and five white females to the defense, 
which utilized its challenges to remove three of the black males, and 
the white male.  The State then challenged another black female, and 
accepted a white male, a black male, and a white female.  The defense 
used its two remaining peremptory challenges to remove two males, 
one white and one black.  The State used its final challenge to remove a 
white female. 
Id. at 59 n.9.  Furthermore, while some courts have not explicitly stated they will recognize 
the race-gender combination, some decisions imply that the court recognizes the 
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Note identifies the various analyses employed by courts in determining 
whether to permit race-gender-based peremptory challenges.92 
1. Courts That Prohibit Race-Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges 
Courts holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids race-gender-
based peremptory challenges fall into two categories.93  Courts in the 
first category hold that Batson and J.E.B. already encompass the hybrid 
group of race and gender.94  Courts in the second category explain that 
Batson and J.E.B. do not already encompass the hybrid group of race and 
gender, but these courts have expanded the reach of Batson and J.E.B. to 
                                                                                                             
combination.  See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 708 So. 2d 220, 226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) 
(explaining that certain peremptory strikes exercised by the State to exclude black male 
potential jurors were not supported by the record and thus must have been ―predicated on 
either race or gender, or both,‖ implying that if a strike is employed on the basis of a 
combination of race and gender, the strike violates equal protection); Blair v. State, 476 
S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. 1996) (concluding that the defendant failed to offer race and gender 
neutral justifications for removing six out of seven white female jurors, thus violating 
Batson and J.E.B. requirements). 
92 See infra Part II.C.1–2 (explaining why some courts have recognized combined race-
gender groups while others have not). 
93 See infra notes 94–95 (identifying the two main analyses courts have applied when 
holding that peremptory challenges may not be based on race-gender identity). 
94 See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 878 A.2d 1273, 1276–77 (D.C. 2005) (reversing the 
trial court‘s ruling that race-gender classifications are not suspect categories and therefore 
not protected under Batson and J.E.B.); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that striking a ―southern male‖ from the jury violated J.E.B. because it is 
unconstitutional to discriminate on the basis of gender, and therefore equally 
unconstitutional to discriminate on the basis of a subsection of gender); State v. Sanderson, 
898 P.2d 483, 489 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the trial court‘s finding of a prima facie 
showing of discrimination on the basis of gender and race was not clearly erroneous); State 
v. Daniels, 122 P.3d 796, 801 (Haw. 2005) (holding that Caucasian males constitute a 
cognizable group under Batson).  In Lucas, the court cited to Sanderson for the proposition 
that a combination of race and gender can be considered cognizable for purposes of Batson.  
Lucas, 18 P.3d. at 163.  The court noted, however, that the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court have refrained from prohibiting race-gender-based peremptory challenges.  Id.  At 
least one court‘s decision, which seems to forbid race-gender-based peremptory challenges, 
has caused confusion due to its ambiguously articulated holding.  See Lammers v. State, 
959 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Ark. 1998) (affirming the trial court‘s decision to recognize a prima facie 
case of discrimination where the defendant used his peremptory challenges to strike white 
males from the jury).  A Massachusetts court understood the Lammers decision to have been 
decided based on an allegation of race-based discrimination, Commonwealth v. Jordan, 785 
N.E.2d 368, 379 n.13 (Mass. 2003), while the Lammers dissent noted that the Batson challenge 
was actually based on a combination of race, gender, and age.  See Lammers, 959 S.W.2d at 
37 (Thornton, J., dissenting) (―Clearly the Batson challenge to Lammers‘s peremptory strike 
could not be sustained solely on the basis of [the challenged juror] being white.‖). 
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specifically recognize a discrete, cognizable group based on race-gender 
identity.95 
On the surface, the two approaches seem similar inasmuch as they 
arrive at the same conclusion.  For example, in Robinson v. United States, 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained it was unnecessary 
to decide whether black females constitute a group that should receive 
heightened scrutiny.96  The relevant question was whether 
discrimination against this group involves discrimination on the basis of 
race, which is prohibited by Batson, and discrimination on the basis of 
gender, which is prohibited by J.E.B.97  The court concluded that 
peremptory challenges aimed at black women violate both Batson and 
J.E.B.98 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 181 (Cal. 1985) (holding that black women 
constitute a cognizable group); State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 2008) (denying 
review of an appellate court decision reversing defendant Whitby‘s conviction on the basis 
that the court failed to require the State to offer a race-neutral justification for striking a 
white male juror).  As Florida law currently stands, Florida‘s Melbourne procedure for 
peremptory challenges applies to groups based on the combination of race and gender.  
Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1133 (Cantero, J., dissenting).  Judge Cantero explained that 
because, as the district court in this case found, Melbourne applies even 
to white male jurors, and because every individual necessarily belongs 
to one distinct racial group or another, theoretically an attorney could 
object to every single peremptory challenge—whether the juror is 
white or black, male or female—without ever providing a reason for 
believing the challenge [was] racially motivated. 
Id.; see also People v. Jerome, 828 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that black 
males are a cognizable group for the same reason set forth in People v. Garcia, 636 N.Y.S.2d 
370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)); People v. Garcia, 636 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(holding that to decide black females are not cognizable would mean they do not have a 
right to full participation in the administration of justice); see also Ross, 16 So. 3d at 59 
(noting that the litigant would need to argue that the State should expand Batson to include 
race-gender-based groups if Mississippi were ever to hold race-gender-based challenges 
unconstitutional).  At least one court has held that a juror‘s race-gender identity is a 
prohibited basis for a peremptory challenge without articulating its justification for the 
holding.  See State v. Shepherd, 989 P.2d 503, 511 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the 
idea that race and gender is not protected, as held by the trial court, was erroneous). 
96 See 878 A.2d at 1284 (explaining that race-gender groups are already protected under 
Batson and its progeny). 
97 Id.  ―[T]he critical question is whether the purposeful use of peremptory strikes to 
exclude black females . . . involves racial and/or gender discrimination.  If it does, then it 
offends basic principles of equal protection and is prohibited under Batson and J.E.B.‖  Id. 
98 Id. ―Two bad partial reasons for a peremptory strike do not add up to a good reason; 
they simply equate to a reason that is doubly bad.‖  Id.  The court explained it was not 
necessary to show the opposing party‘s peremptory challenge was motivated only by race 
or gender because such a requirement would not reflect reality as motivations behind 
peremptory strikes are often diverse.  Id.  In reaching this decision, the court used a 
―tainted‖ analysis, explaining that even if some of the reasons for the challenge were 
neutral, a single discriminatory justification would taint the entire challenge.  See supra 
notes 45–47 (explaining the difference between tainted and dual motivation analyses). 
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In contrast, the California Supreme Court held that race-gender 
identity is an impermissible basis for peremptory challenges as a 
necessary expansion of Batson, rather than holding that Batson and J.E.B. 
already prohibit race-gender discrimination.99  The court explained that 
race-gender identity influences the jurors‘ life experiences.100  Thus, 
striking jurors because of their race-gender identity would impair the 
impartiality of the jury.101  Moreover, expanding Batson to race-gender 
                                                 
99 See Motton, 704 P.2d at 181 (holding that peremptorily striking potential jurors on the 
basis of their race-gender identity must be prohibited); see also Montoya, supra note 89, at 
403 (using an intersectional theory framework to expand Batson to race-gender groups). 
100 Motton, 704 P.2d at 181; see also Wanda A. Hendricks, On the Margins:  Creating a Space 
and Place in the Academy, in TELLING HISTORIES:  BLACK WOMEN HISTORIANS IN THE IVORY 
TOWER 146, 146–57 (Deborah Gray White ed., 2008) (discussing the way the author‘s past 
life experiences, race, and gender have influenced her life and led her to a career in 
academia).  Hendricks, a professor, explains that the way her students have reacted to her 
has been profoundly influenced by her race-gender identity.  See id. at 154–55.  For 
example, when Hendricks taught a course on United States history, her white students 
were surprised that a black female professor would be ―teach[ing] them ‗their‘ history.‖  Id. 
at 154.  Hendricks also explains that her race-gender identity played a role, not only in her 
communication and dealings with students, but also in her relationships with other faculty 
members.  Id. at 153.  She notes that certain responsibilities were passed on to her because 
she was a junior faculty member and a black woman.  Id. at 153–54.  For example, 
Hendricks explains that ―as a member of graduate committees of African American 
students or students working on African American topics, I have been coerced into 
becoming the lead reader while the tenured professor received primary credit.‖  Id. at 153.  
Mia Bay also describes the way her race and gender have influenced her life by discussing 
her personal history and her mother‘s history.  See Mia Bay, Looking Backward in Order to Go 
Forward:  Black Women Historians and Black Women’s History, in TELLING HISTORIES:  BLACK 
WOMEN HISTORIANS IN THE IVORY TOWER, supra, at 182, 183–94 (describing Bay‘s discovery 
of African American women‘s history and how Bay‘s mother‘s history has influenced her 
life).  Bay, a history major, did not become aware of African American women‘s history 
until she was a graduate student at Yale.  Id. at 191.  It was not until the early 1990‘s that 
black feminist texts and historians began calling for more attention to be paid to black 
women‘s history.  Id. at 192.  Bay also notes that even with the progress that has been made 
in the field of black women‘s history, the field is still often overlooked outside the realm of 
African American and women‘s history.  Id. at 194. 
101 See Motton, 704 P.2d at 181–82 (justifying the expansion of Batson to black women).  
Although some California judges have accepted that race-gender identity influences one‘s 
life experiences, at least one judge has doubted whether the courts have gathered sufficient 
evidence to support this assertion.  Compare id. (opining that black women as a group 
possess a unique variety of human experiences and discrimination against them during 
jury selection affects the jury‘s ability ―‗to achieve an overall impartiality‘ in their decision-
making processes‖) (citing People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (Cal. 1978)), and People v. 
Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852–53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (expanding Motton and deeming 
African American males a cognizable group without additional analysis), with People v. 
Young, 105 P.3d 487, 542–43 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining that the court 
lacks evidence to support the proposition that black women are subject to a unique form of 
discrimination and further explaining that whether certain groups are cognizable depends 
on the definition of ―cognizable group,‖ which has not been clearly articulated by the 
California or federal courts). 
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groups is justified in the sense that, like groups based on race or gender, 
certain race-gender groups share a history of past discrimination.102  
                                                 
102 See Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 25–30 (examining the past history of discrimination 
against black women).  Scales-Trent emphasizes that discrimination experienced by black 
women during slavery was qualitatively different than that experienced by black men.  See 
id. at 26.  She notes that some pre-Civil War statutes were applied specifically to black 
women rather than distinguishing between groups on the sole basis of race or gender.  Id. 
at 27.  For example, Scales-Trent notes that a 1643 Virginia statute defined ―tithable 
persons‖ as ―those who worked the ground.‖  Id.  This group specifically encompassed all 
adult men and black women.  Id.  Scales-Trent also describes the history of political 
powerlessness of black women, noting that they had to fight for the right to vote twice, first 
as blacks and second as women.  Id. at 30.  Even after obtaining the right to vote, black 
women were often required to wait to register to vote until white women had done so and 
they were forced to pay special taxes that were imposed only on black women.  Id. at 32; see 
also Smith, supra note 80, at 188–205 (examining the economic exploitation of black women 
before and after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued); Vernetta D. Young & Zoe 
Spencer, Multiple Jeopardy:  The Impact of Race, Gender, and Slavery on the Punishment of 
Women in Antebellum America, in RACE, GENDER & PUNISHMENT:  FROM COLONIALISM TO THE 
WAR ON TERROR 65, 66–67 (Mary Bosworth & Jeanne Flavin eds., 2007) (examining the way 
in which race-gender identity influenced the punishment of both white and black women 
in antebellum America).  Smith discusses the interplay of race and gender throughout her 
article, explaining that 
race is a powerful advantage for White women that is not wholly 
diminished by their gender.  Black wom[e]n have wanted White 
women to see that when race is taken into account, Black women‘s 
experiences are fundamentally different in all respects from White 
women‘s experiences. . . . Consequently, whether women are valued as 
mothers, wives or laborers is very much dependent upon their 
race/gender subgroup. 
Smith, supra note 80, at 194. 
 This past history of discrimination continues to influence the lives of members of 
many race-gender groups today.  Cf. Cleopatra Howard Caldwell, Barbara J. Guthrie & 
James S. Jackson, Identity Development, Discrimination, and Psychological Well-Being Among 
African American and Caribbean Black Adolescents, in GENDER, RACE, CLASS, & HEALTH:  
INTERSECTIONAL APPROACHES 163, 166 (Amy J. Schulz & Leith Mullings eds., 2006) 
(explaining that America‘s history of racism and slavery continue to affect many African 
Americans today); Cecilia A. Conrad, Changes in the Labor Market Status of Black Women, 
1960–2000, in AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 157, 157–61 (Cecilia A. Conrad, 
John Whitehead, Patrick Mason & James Stewart, eds., 2005) (chronicling the great 
economic progress experienced by black women between 1960 to 1980 and suggesting 
factors that have led to the slowing of economic advancement of black women between 
1980 to 2000); Pamela Braboy Jackson & David R. Williams, The Intersection of Race, Gender, 
and SES:  Health Paradoxes, in GENDER, RACE, CLASS, & HEALTH, supra, at 141 (identifying the 
unique stereotypes that African American women face in the workplace); Montoya, supra 
note 89, at 397–98 (identifying empirical research establishing a correlation between an 
individual‘s combined racial and gender identity and other life experiences, such as living 
in poverty).  For example, Montoya cites to one study finding that white men were able to 
purchase a car at a lower price than white women, black men, and black women, despite 
the fact that the study participants used the same bargaining strategies.  Montoya, supra 
note 89, at 397; see also Smith, supra note 80, at 256 (analyzing the judiciary‘s past treatment 
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Permitting race-gender-based peremptory strikes condones prejudicial 
stereotypes about race-gender groups.103  Part III of this Note discusses 
the consequences of using either of these two approaches.104 
In addition, a few courts have deemed race-gender groups protected 
from discrimination during jury selection without using either of the two 
analyses outlined above.105  Massachusetts, for example, concluded that 
race-gender identity is an impermissible basis for peremptory challenges 
based on its state constitution.106  The Massachusetts Constitution 
demands that a litigant be offered a jury of his peers.107  Therefore, in 
order to have a representative jury, litigants are prohibited from 
exercising race-gender-based strikes.108  Not all courts, however, have 
concluded that race-gender identity is an impermissible basis for 
                                                                                                             
of black women and black men).  Smith describes race-gender groups in a hierarchical 
relation to one another as follows: 
As to those who have been historically and traditionally oppressed, 
when quantitative access to the economic markets are taken into 
account, White women are on top of the hierarchy, followed by Black 
women and Black men respectively.  All, however, remain 
economically subordinate to the White male, the subgroup most 
protected by and benefitting from judicial affinity. 
Smith, supra note 80, at 256. 
103 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141–42 (1994) (―All persons . . . have the right not 
to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that 
reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination.‖); see also supra note 23 
(explaining that stereotypes about a group based on combinations of attributes are often 
much richer than stereotypes aimed at a broader group). 
104 See infra Part III (analyzing the approaches currently applied when considering 
objections to allegedly race-gender-based peremptory challenges). 
105 See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (describing the way Massachusetts has 
looked to its state constitution when considering race-gender-based peremptory strikes). 
106 Commonwealth v. Jordan, 785 N.E.2d 368, 378–79, 380 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing a 
wealth of uncertainty in the federal and state courts as to whether they should recognize 
combined race-gender groups, but stating that article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution 
requires that Massachusetts protect this combination); see also State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 
40, 50 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that discrimination on the basis of race and gender is 
prohibited).  State v. Gonzales was decided prior to J.E.B. and therefore the court made its 
decision based on the Equal Protection Clause and the New Mexico Constitution.  Gonzales, 
808 P.2d at 44–50.  The Gonzales court held that Hispanics and males were cognizable 
groups—Hispanics due to Batson, and males due to the state constitution.  Id.  Therefore, 
using peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic males from the jury based on their race-
gender identity was impermissible.  Id. at 50. 
107 MASS. CONST. art. XII. 
108 See Jordan, 785 N.E.2d at 380 (holding that race-gender discrimination is forbidden by 
the Massachusetts Constitution). 
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peremptory challenges.109  The next subsection discusses the reasoning 
employed by these courts.110 
2. Courts That Allow Race-Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges 
Some courts do not prohibit race-gender discrimination during jury 
selection.111  In People v. Washington, an Illinois appellate court refused to 
recognize black men as a cognizable group, fearing recognition of 
subgroups would result in an explosion of hybrid subcategories, 
essentially abolishing the peremptory challenge.112  Other courts, 
although not expressly rejecting the idea of recognizing race-gender 
groups, have implied that they will not recognize them.113 
                                                 
109 See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (identifying decisions holding that 
jurors‘ race-gender identities are not protected from discrimination during jury selection). 
110 See infra Part II.C.2 (examining the analysis used to conclude that race-gender-based 
challenges are permissible). 
111 See People v. Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (declining to 
consider ―black men‖ a cognizable group for purposes of Batson).  Notably, People v. 
Washington was decided prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in J.E.B.  See supra notes 54–
59 and accompanying text (describing J.E.B. v. Alabama, which held that gender is an 
impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge).  The Washington court noted, however, 
that the Illinois Constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender.  Washington, 
628 N.E.2d at 355.  Thus, the court‘s analysis demonstrates that even if J.E.B. were to have 
been decided before People v. Washington, the result likely would have been the same.  See 
id. at 355–56 (explaining that the defendant is not arguing that the jurors were struck solely 
on the basis of race or solely on the basis of gender, but rather the jurors were struck on the 
basis of their race-gender identity).  Furthermore, in People v. Harris, the Illinois Supreme 
Court expanded on People v. Washington and refused to extend Batson to combined racial or 
ethnic groups.  See People v. Harris, 647 N.E.2d 893, 904 (Ill. 1994) (explaining that 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination against jurors who are members of one 
race, such as African American jurors, does not also establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination against jurors of other racial or ethnic backgrounds, such as Hispanic 
jurors); see also United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to 
acknowledge race-gender discrimination); United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding that black males are not a cognizable group).  But see J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130 n.1 (1994) (noting that Nichols refused to extend Batson to 
gender without mentioning the issue of combined race-gender identity).  In light of the fact 
that the J.E.B. Court refrained from noting that Nichols involved combined race-gender 
discrimination, this author suggests that it is possible the Supreme Court believed it had 
resolved this issue by prohibiting gender-based strikes. 
112 628 N.E.2d at 356.  People v. Washington may have been resolved differently had the 
court decided to prohibit race-gender discrimination.  In that case, the State excused two 
black males from the jury during jury selection.  Id. at 352.  The judge held that this did not 
constitute a prima facie showing of race discrimination because black women were still on 
the venire.  Id.  Consequently, the trial jury included six white males, one white female, and 
five black females.  Id. at 352–53.  No black males sat on the jury or served as alternate 
jurors.  Id. 
113 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 808 A.2d 388, 397–98 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the 
prosecution‘s justifications for striking two black males from the jury were race-neutral and 
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This divergence in views as to whether peremptory challenges may 
be based on race-gender identity stems partly from the United States 
Supreme Court‘s avoidance of the issue.  In fact, as discussed in the next 
subsection of this Note, the Court recently missed the opportunity to 
acknowledge the challenges courts have faced when determining 
whether to prohibit race-gender-based challenges.114 
3. The Supreme Court‘s Missed Opportunity to Take Notice of This 
Issue 
Rivera v. Illinois illustrates the uncertainty of whether race-gender 
groups are cognizable under Batson.115  Rivera was found guilty of first-
degree murder and appealed, asserting that the judge improperly raised 
a Batson challenge sua sponte when Rivera peremptorily challenged a 
female African American juror.116  The judge never articulated the basis 
for his objection, but Rivera alleged the objection was based on an 
inference of race-gender discrimination.117  Rivera also claimed that race-
                                                                                                             
therefore the trial court was correct in denying the defendant‘s objection to the 
prosecution‘s peremptory challenge); State v. Dressner, No. 2008-KA-1366, 2010 WL 
2723706, at *21 (La. July 6, 2010) (explaining that the defense used five out of six 
peremptory challenges to excuse white males, and the trial court analyzed this as a race-
based challenge).  In these decisions, the courts analyzed Batson challenges as though only 
race discrimination were involved; however, the evidence set forth by the parties suggested 
that the challenges were race-gender-based.  See Jackson, 808 A.2d at 399 (―The defendants 
contend that the questions asked of [the challenged juror] were dissimilar to the questions 
asked of other venirepersons and were actually motivated by his gender and race.‖).  This 
author suggests that the courts‘ decisions to analyze only race discrimination, as opposed 
to race-gender discrimination, may indicate that these courts do not prohibit race-gender-
based challenges. 
114 See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the Illinois race-gender peremptory challenge case and 
the Supreme Court‘s response). 
115 See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1451–52 (2009) (noting that the Illinois courts 
disagreed as to whether the peremptory challenge at issue should have been analyzed as 
gender- or race-gender-based). 
116 People v. Rivera, 810 N.E.2d 129, 130–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).  Rivera claimed that he 
wanted to excuse the juror because she worked at a clinic that treated victims of gunshot 
wounds.  People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 788 (Ill. 2006).  The court interrupted Rivera and 
noted that the juror appeared to be African American.  Id.  Rivera explained that he had 
accepted an African American female onto the jury already, but the judge stated that this 
juror was the second African American female that Rivera had attempted to eliminate.  Id.  
Ultimately, the judge refused to sustain the challenge and never clarified which evidence 
the judge deemed dispositive of the issue.  Id.  Rivera requested leave to ask the juror 
additional questions, including information about her interactions with victims of gun 
violence.  Id.  After questioning, Rivera again requested to use a peremptory challenge to 
excuse the juror.  Id. at 788–89.  Rivera then stated that he was trying to add men to the jury 
because the jury primarily contained women.  Id.  The judge overruled Rivera‘s request.  Id. 
117 Rivera, 852 N.E.2d at 789 (noting that the trial court failed to state the basis for raising 
the Batson challenge); Rivera, 810 N.E.2d at 136 (describing the basis for Rivera‘s appeal). 
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gender-based strikes are permitted.118  The appellate court never reached 
the issue of whether race-gender-based strikes are allowed, but the 
dissent opined that Batson‘s focus is on members of a single group, not 
combinations of groups.119 
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the decision and remanded the 
case to determine the basis for the judge‘s objection.120  The court opined 
that Batson was most concerned with discrimination on the basis of a 
single group membership.121  On remand, the trial judge stated that his 
objection was based on an inference of gender discrimination.122  The 
court subsequently found insufficient evidence to establish gender 
discrimination; thus, the denial of the challenge was in error.123 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether reversal is necessary when a litigant is erroneously deprived of 
a peremptory challenge.124  The Court held that it is not.125  The Court 
                                                 
118 Rivera, 810 N.E.2d at 136 (―Defendant argues inter alia that combined race-gender 
discrimination cannot form the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination.‖). 
119 See id. (explaining that any issues arising out of the first step of the Batson procedure 
were moot); see also id. at 144 (Frossard, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Batson‘s prime 
concern is discrimination on the basis of a single group). 
120 Rivera, 852 N.E.2d at 791. 
121 Id. at 779–80.  To support this assertion, the court cited to People v. Washington, an 
appellate court case holding that Batson does not extend to race-gender groups.  Id. at 779.  
Further, the court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court cited to People v. Washington when 
it refused to extend Batson protection to groups comprised of combinations of different 
racial or ethnic groups.  Id. at 779–80.  Additionally, the court considered whether a prima 
facie case of race discrimination could be established because the State argued on appeal 
that the trial court based its challenge solely on the juror‘s race, not a combination of race 
and gender.  Id. at 789.  The court concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case of race discrimination.  Id. at 790. 
122 People v. Rivera, 879 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. 2007). 
123 Id. at 884.  In the beginning of the opinion, the court intimated that it disbelieved the 
judge‘s assertion that his objection was based on gender discrimination by noting that the 
judge had stated that the juror‘s race was a significant factor in his objection.  Id. at 880.  
Further, the court criticized the judge for claiming to have based his prima facie showing 
on gender discrimination because, although Rivera made a comment about wanting to 
increase the number of men on the jury, that comment was not made until after the judge 
required Rivera to articulate a reason for the challenge.  Id. at 881.  The conclusion of the 
opinion made it clear that the court felt the judge actually based his objection on race 
discrimination or race-gender discrimination.  See id. at 884 (―The trial judge‘s statements 
during jury selection, frankly, suggested that he believed defense counsel was engaged in 
either racial discrimination or combined race-gender discrimination.  Otherwise, why 
would the judge repeatedly emphasize that [the juror] was African-American?‖). 
124 Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1452 (2009) (examining consequences that arise when 
a defendant, although tried by an unbiased jury, is erroneously denied a peremptory 
challenge). 
125 Id. at 1456 (holding that state law determines the ramifications of the erroneous denial 
of a peremptory challenge and the Illinois Supreme Court held that reversal was not 
required). 
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also mentioned that the Illinois Supreme Court did not believe the 
judge‘s challenge was gender-based but made no mention as to whether 
the combination of race and gender is protected under Batson and 
J.E.B.126 
Overall, courts have come to differing conclusions in determining 
whether to recognize race-gender groups as cognizable.127  Some courts 
hold that litigants are prohibited from basing a peremptory challenge on 
a juror‘s race-gender identity due to Batson‘s prohibition against race 
discrimination and J.E.B.‘s prohibition against gender discrimination.128  
Other courts reach the same result by expanding Batson to encompass 
this additional group.129  In contrast, some courts have held that Batson 
and J.E.B. refer only to a single, specific source of discrimination and 
refuse to deem race-gender groups cognizable.130  Part III of this Note 
will analyze the costs and benefits of these approaches.131  This Note also 
looks to Title VII jurisprudence for guidance in determining whether to 
permit race-gender-based strikes.132 
III.  ANALYSIS 
As explained in Part II, courts take different approaches in 
determining whether to recognize race-gender groups as cognizable.133  
This Part will analyze the costs and benefits of these approaches.134  Part 
III.A explains that the reasons proffered for condoning race-gender-
based challenges are unjustified.135  Part III.B and Part III.C both describe 
                                                 
126 Id. at 1452 (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court failed to find evidence of any form 
of discrimination).  The Court noted that Batson and subsequent cases hold that litigants are 
―constitutionally prohibited from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex.‖  See id. at 1451. 
127 See supra Part II.C (describing the courts‘ treatment of discrimination on the basis of 
combined race-gender groups). 
128 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining one justification for recognizing race-gender identity 
under Batson and J.E.B.). 
129 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing a second justification for recognizing race-gender 
identity). 
130 See supra Part II.C.2–3 (explaining that some courts have refused to recognize race-
gender identity as a cognizable group). 
131 See infra Part III (critiquing the methods courts have applied when addressing claims 
of race and gender discrimination). 
132 See infra Part III (applying the lessons learned in the employment law context to the 
peremptory challenge realm). 
133 See supra Part II.C (describing the courts‘ treatment of discrimination on the basis of 
race-gender identity). 
134 See infra Part III (discussing whether race-gender groups should be deemed 
cognizable for purposes of Batson). 
135 See infra Part III.A (dissecting the justifications for permitting race-gender-based 
strikes). 
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the negative consequences of failing to deem race-gender groups 
cognizable.136  Finally, Part III.D explains why Batson must be expanded 
to include race-gender groups.137 
A. Arguments in Support of Race-Gender-Based Strikes are Unjustified 
Some courts have held that race-gender groups are not cognizable.138  
Proponents claim this decision is justified by two main contentions.139  
First, the Supreme Court has never stated that race-gender groups are 
protected.140  The Court has even expressed reservation about imposing 
more limitations on the challenge due to the important interests it 
furthers.141  Second, courts are wary of extending protection to additional 
                                                 
136 See infra Part III.B–C (identifying two consequences that arise when combined race-
gender groups are not protected under Batson:  (1) the creation of a loophole permitting 
discriminatory peremptory challenges and (2) the destruction of Batson‘s symbolic 
significance). 
137 See infra Part III.D (advocating the expansion of Batson to race-gender groups). 
138 See supra Part II.C.2 (identifying courts that do not recognize race-gender groups as 
cognizable). 
139 See infra notes 140–55 and accompanying text (describing and critiquing the proffered 
justifications for not prohibiting combined race-gender–based strikes). 
140 See supra Part II.C.3 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
issue of combined race-gender-based strikes, even after reviewing a case where the issue of 
race-gender discrimination was discussed by the lower court); see also People v. 
Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize ―black males‖ as 
a discrete cognizable group for purposes of Batson).  The Illinois Appellate Court explained 
as follows: 
If we apply the Batson principles at the prima facie stage of the analysis 
to subcategories of race and gender, not only will we have created new 
hybrid suspect groups, but we will have effectively destroyed both the 
peremptory challenge and the Batson decision. . . . ―[I]f the Supreme 
Court in Batson had desired, it could have abolished the peremptory 
challenge or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of 
race, gender, age, or other group classification.‖  We believe, however, 
along with several other courts, that ―in light of the important position 
of the peremptory challenge in our jury system, the Court intended 
Batson to apply to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on 
the basis of race only.‖ 
Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 850 
F.2d 1038, 1042, 1042–43 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
141 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the courts‘ reluctance to impose 
additional limitations on the peremptory challenge); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 
149–50 (1994) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the decision to prohibit gender-
based challenges infringes on the ability of litigants to use the challenge, and in light of the 
importance of the peremptory challenge as a litigation tool, advocating that this restriction 
apply only to the government‘s peremptory challenges). 
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groups for fear that all aspects of jurors‘ identities will eventually be 
protected, rendering the challenge useless.142 
The first contention, that the Supreme Court‘s misgivings about 
placing limits on peremptory strikes should counsel against prohibition 
of race-gender-based strikes, is unjustified.143  The Court has consistently 
held that peremptory challenges will be limited as necessary to avoid 
equal protection violations.144  Furthermore, the Court has explained that 
the first step of Batson is not meant to impose a high burden on 
litigants.145  Failing to recognize race-gender groups, however, imposes a 
high burden because it makes it more difficult to object to discrimination 
on the basis of race or gender, and makes it impossible to object to race-
gender discrimination.146 
The second contention, that recognition of race-gender groups will 
result in a slippery slope effectively eliminating the challenge, is also 
insufficient to justify not deeming race-gender groups cognizable.147  
First, when it becomes necessary to choose between rendering 
peremptory challenges useless or risking the violation of equal 
protection, the Constitution demands the former.148  Furthermore, it is 
                                                 
142 See, e.g., People v. Young, 105 P.3d 487, 542 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring) 
(expressing concern that recognition of ―cross-categories‖ as distinct cognizable groups 
will lead to an unending combination of cognizable subgroups); supra text accompanying 
note 112 (expressing concern that the creation of hybrid groups would destroy Batson). 
143 See infra notes 144, 148 (describing the Supreme Court‘s willingness to impose 
limitations on peremptory challenges). 
144 See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Supreme Court has not refrained from 
intruding on litigants‘ peremptory challenge rights in cases implicating equal protection 
concerns). 
145 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that the first step in Batson imposes a 
low burden); see also supra notes 41–42 (recognizing that some states have eliminated the 
prima facie showing requirement).  In Johnson v. California, the United States Supreme 
Court emphasized that Batson was meant to address ―suspicions and inferences‖ of 
discrimination.  545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005).  The way in which peremptory challenges are 
exercised, without justification, necessarily leaves some uncertainty as to whether the basis 
for the challenge is discriminatory.  Id.  Thus, parties objecting to a peremptory challenge 
are permitted to base the objection on an inference to help encourage ―prompt rulings‖ on 
Batson challenges, while still addressing and remedying discriminatory jury selection.  Id. 
146 See infra Part III.B (explaining that race-gender discrimination must be expressly 
prohibited in order to fully prevent race-based or gender-based discrimination from 
occurring). 
147 See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text (asserting that the recognition of 
combined race-gender groups as protected will not impose an undue burden on the 
courts). 
148 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (―[W]ere it 
necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury 
chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to 
challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former.‖) (quoting Swain 
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unlikely that recognition of race-gender groups would force courts to 
spend an overwhelming amount of time reviewing Batson challenges.149  
The Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in J.E.B.150  In that 
case, the Court emphasized that proving a juror was excluded on the 
basis of his membership in a protected group requires that the opposing 
party demonstrate that this group membership gave rise to the 
challenge.151  If the trial judge determines that the opposing party has not 
established a prima facie case, the inquiry ends.152  The Court also noted 
that if an explanation is required, the proponent of the challenge does 
not need to offer as thorough of a justification as would be needed to 
defend a challenge for cause.153 
Additionally, race-gender groups are already recognized as 
cognizable in some jurisdictions and those courts have not subsequently 
eliminated peremptory challenges due to a proliferation of Batson 
hearings.154  In fact, Florida has not only deemed race-gender-based 
groups cognizable, but also Florida has completely eliminated the prima 
facie requirement at the first step of Batson and peremptory challenges 
continue to be an important aspect of the state‘s jury selection process.155 
The refusal to prohibit race-gender-based strikes is not only 
unjustified, but it also yields detrimental consequences.156  These 
consequences include the creation of a loophole permitting equal 
protection violations against members of suspect classes and the 
destruction of Batson‘s symbolic significance as a message of intolerance 
for discrimination.157 
                                                                                                             
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), overruled by Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
149 See infra notes 150–55 and accompanying text. 
150 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (stating that expanding Batson to 
gender-based challenges would not be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial courts). 
151 See id. (explaining that courts are capable of barring peremptory challenges based on 
gender as evidenced through the courts that have already prohibited peremptory 
challenges based on gender). 
152 See supra Part II.A (discussing the prima facie requirement). 
153 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145. 
154 See supra Part II.C.1 (describing the courts that currently recognize race-gender groups 
as cognizable). 
155 See supra notes 41–42 (discussing Florida‘s procedure for examining Batson 
challenges). 
156 See infra Part III.B–C (describing the consequences of not recognizing race-gender 
groups as cognizable for purposes of Batson). 
157 See infra Part III.B–C (describing the loophole created when courts choose not to 
recognize race-gender groups as cognizable and examining the implications of not 
recognizing race-gender groups on Batson‘s symbolic function). 
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B. Preventing Review of Unconstitutional Peremptory Challenges 
This Note asserts that race-gender-based challenges violate equal 
protection.158  Nonetheless, even if the Supreme Court were to conclude 
that peremptory challenges may be based on a juror‘s race-gender 
identity, failure to recognize race-gender groups creates a loophole for 
race- or gender-based discrimination, which is clearly prohibited.159  The 
Supreme Court overturned Swain in Batson because it found that 
requiring a litigant to establish a pattern of discriminatory peremptory 
challenges over time, rather than using evidence from a single case, 
consequently left peremptory challenges ―largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny.‖160  Discrimination on the basis of race, when 
combined with gender, becomes immune from scrutiny when litigants 
cannot pass the first step of Batson in order to challenge a discriminatory 
peremptory strike.161 
If race-gender-based challenges are permitted, litigants will be able 
to defend against allegations of race-based or gender-based 
discrimination by asserting that their peremptory challenges are actually 
                                                 
158 See infra Part III.D (asserting that equal protection demands that courts prohibit 
invidious race-gender discrimination during jury selection). 
159 See supra Part II.A (explaining that peremptory challenges may not be based on race or 
gender). 
160 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1986) (opining that the decision in Swain 
made it difficult to object to the exercise of peremptory challenges); see also supra Part II.A 
(describing the burden imposed by Swain and the Batson Court‘s response). 
161 See supra notes 111–12 (discussing People v. Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993), where the court refused to consider black males cognizable for purposes of Batson).  
In People v. Washington, the prosecutor was alleged to have peremptorily challenged black 
males from the jury because of their race-gender identity.  628 N.E.2d 351, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993).  The defendant, however, could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
against black males because the trial court refused to deem black males cognizable.  Id. at 
356.  Furthermore, the defendant could not allege race discrimination because black women 
were on the jury, which destroyed his prima facie case.  Id. at 352.  Although no black men 
sat on the jury or served as alternates, it was impossible for the defendant to persuade the 
court to require that the prosecutor explain the challenges because the court refused to 
deem race-gender groups cognizable.  See id. at 352–53. 
 People v. Washington is especially informative when considering that some courts 
apply a ―tainted‖ analysis at the second step of the Batson inquiry.  See supra notes 45–47 
and accompanying text (describing mixed motive and tainted analysis).  Under the tainted 
analysis, if a single discriminatory basis is stated as a justification for the strike, the 
peremptory strike must be denied.  Supra note 46.  Courts that choose to apply this analysis 
may not have the opportunity to do so when a claim is based on race-gender identity 
because such a claim may not move past the first step of the Batson inquiry if race-gender-
based groups are not cognizable.  This is one illustration of the way in which 
unconstitutional peremptory challenges, or peremptory strikes that would normally be 
denied by a court, escape judicial scrutiny when race-gender identity is not deemed 
cognizable. 
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race-gender-based.  Similarly, in J.E.B, the Supreme Court recognized 
that a prohibition on the use of gender-based challenges is necessary, not 
only because gender is an inappropriate proxy for determining juror 
capability, but also because gender should not be used as a pretext for 
race discrimination.162  The Court emphasized that race and gender are 
overlapping categories, and, as such, lower courts had difficulty 
determining whether peremptory challenges were exercised on the basis 
of race or the then-permitted basis of gender.163  The Court‘s decision 
holding gender protected for Batson purposes was, presumably, meant to 
achieve two objectives:  to remedy the violation of equal protection 
inherent in gender-based strikes and to require courts to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of overlapping categories of race and 
gender.164  Failure to recognize race-gender groups creates a loophole for 
litigants to use in order to discriminate on the basis of either of two 
protected statuses:  race or gender.165  In light of the discussion in J.E.B. 
regarding the need to close loopholes that allow discrimination, race-
gender groups must be deemed cognizable.  It is of no small significance 
that if the failure to deem race-gender groups cognizable results in the 
exercise of even a single race- or gender-based challenge, the United 
States Constitution has been violated.166 
C. Negating Batson’s Message of Intolerance for Discrimination 
The failure to prohibit race-gender-based strikes also destroys 
Batson‘s function as a symbol of the judiciary‘s intolerance for 
                                                 
162 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994) (explaining that to permit gender-based 
peremptory challenges conflicts with the purpose of Batson because it could help to mask 
race-based discrimination); see also supra note 55 (noting that gender could be used as an 
unconstitutional proxy for discrimination on the basis of race). 
163 See supra note 55 (explaining that gender-based peremptory challenges must be 
prohibited because they contravene equal protection and could insulate race-based 
discrimination from judicial scrutiny). 
164 See supra note 55 (explaining that the J.E.B. Court held that peremptory challenges 
based on gender violate equal protection and can be used to frustrate the purpose of 
Batson).  Furthermore, the fact that the Court recently had the opportunity to comment on 
whether the combination of race and gender is protected under Batson but refrained from 
doing so may illustrate that the Court finds it has already answered the question in the 
affirmative.  See supra Part II.C.3 (offering an overview of the Supreme Court‘s recent case 
regarding peremptory challenges). 
165 See supra Part II.A (describing equal protection analysis and explaining that race and 
gender are given added protection because of the history of past discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of race or sex, thus demanding strict scrutiny and intermediate 
scrutiny, respectively). 
166 See Walker v. Girdich, 410 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2005) (―[U]nder Batson and its 
progeny, striking even a single juror for a discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional.‖). 
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discrimination.167  As was discussed in the context of Title VII and sex-
plus jurisprudence, the failure to prohibit race-gender-based 
discrimination can be viewed as the law ignoring the importance of race-
gender identity, arguably an extension or ratification of the law‘s 
historically unfair treatment of racial and ethnic minorities and white 
women.168  Furthermore, it is illogical to assume that Batson could serve 
as a deterrent to discrimination if litigants could avoid its command by 
discriminating on the basis of the intersection of a juror‘s race and 
gender.169 
Even without expanding Batson, some courts have recognized the 
combination of race and gender as a cognizable group under the 
presumption that Batson and J.E.B. already encompass the race-gender 
combination.170  Neglecting to expand Batson, however, and only 
recognizing race-gender groups in order to prohibit race or gender 
discrimination, rather than race-gender discrimination, fails to 
acknowledge that race-gender discrimination is more than sexism or 
racism; it is a distinct form of discrimination.171  Race-gender groups 
share the normal indicia of a suspect class.172  Not only have race-gender 
groups historically been the targets of overt discrimination, but also race-
                                                 
167 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149  (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that Batson serves as 
―a statement about what this Nation stands for‖) (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 
U.S. 940, 941–42 (O‘Connor, J., concurring)); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), 
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (explaining that peremptory challenges 
help to ―satisfy the appearance of justice‖) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955)); see also Covey, supra note 47, at 316 (explaining that one of Batson‘s functions is to 
illustrate that the courts will not condone race discrimination). 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 76–80 (describing the courts‘ decision to recognize 
race-gender discrimination as a distinct form of discrimination protected by Title VII); see 
also Castro, supra note 71, at 160 (contending that the legal system has contributed to the 
subordination of women and people of color, for example, by not permitting women to 
practice law); Smith, supra note 80, at 255 (concluding that economic hierarchies based on 
race-gender identity exist today and are reinforced by judicial holdings); supra notes 5, 53 
(examining the historical exclusion of white women and blacks from jury service); supra 
note 102 (identifying a history of discrimination against white women and blacks and 
illustrating the way race- and gender-based stereotypes persist in society today). 
169 See supra text accompanying note 80 (explaining that the Jefferies court noted it was 
important to recognize race-gender discrimination in order to deter employers from 
discriminating against black women and other race-gender groups). 
170 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the recognition of race-gender identity as a protected 
group). 
171 See supra note 76 (noting that one court has recognized that the stereotypes that Asian 
women face are different than those white women or Asian men face); supra notes 100, 102 
(offering examples throughout history of the distinct form of discrimination against black 
women). 
172 See infra notes 180, 184–86 and accompanying text (acknowledging race-gender 
identity is an immutable characteristic, and many race-gender-based groups share a history 
of past discrimination and lack of political power). 
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gender identity continues to influence social relations and life 
experiences today.173  Stereotypes that stem from discrimination based 
on race-gender identity should not suffice to deny jurors the privilege to 
serve on a jury, nor should this history of discrimination be ignored and 
placed under an umbrella of race or gender discrimination.174 
Overall, the argument that recognizing race-gender identity will lead 
to a limitless number of protected groups is an insufficient justification 
for refusing to expand Batson.175  The consequences of not recognizing 
race-gender groups, including the creation of a loophole immunizing 
race- or gender-based challenges from review and the destruction of 
Batson as a symbol of intolerance for discrimination, lead to the 
conclusion that race-gender groups must be protected from 
discrimination during jury selection.176  As explained, mere recognition 
that Batson and J.E.B. already encompass race-gender groups fails to 
recognize the unique discrimination faced by individuals based on their 
race-gender group membership.177 
D. Equal Protection Demands Recognition of Race-Gender Groups 
As opposed to recognizing race-gender groups under Batson and 
J.E.B., some courts have expanded Batson and recognize race-gender 
identity as a discrete cognizable group.178  Various courts and 
                                                 
173 See Smith, supra note 80, at 222 (describing the various forms or combinations of 
discrimination that black women may face, which differ from the type of discrimination 
faced by black men or white women).  Smith explains the following: 
In essence, as a member of a subgroup based on race/gender, a Black 
woman is not spared from experiencing multiple forms of 
discrimination.  She may experience subgroup discrimination as a 
Black woman.  She may experience group-based discrimination as a 
woman.  She may also experience group-based discrimination as a 
Black person.  For the Black woman, there are multiple and 
intersecting points of discrimination. 
Id.; see also supra note 100 (offering two women‘s descriptions of the way their race-gender 
identity affects their lives). 
174 See supra note 23 (providing examples of blatant use of race-gender-based stereotypes 
during jury selection and noting that discrimination is oftentimes much more subtle). 
175 See supra Part III.A (concluding that the reasons suggested for not deeming race-
gender groups cognizable fail to be persuasive when analyzed more thoroughly). 
176 See supra Part III.B–C (describing the negative consequences of failing to prohibit 
peremptory challenges based on race-gender identity). 
177 See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text (noting that merely deeming race-
gender groups cognizable in order to address sexism and racism is insufficient to achieve 
the purpose of Batson). 
178 See supra Part II.C.1 (analyzing the approach some courts have taken in adopting an 
expansion of Batson). 
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commentators advocate this expansion, an approach justified by two 
main considerations.179 
First, the expansion of Batson is advocated in light of the fact that the 
intersection of race and gender creates a unique life viewpoint that 
should not be struck from the jury.180  The desire to have a jury reflect the 
diverse views of the community, although laudable, is not required by 
the Constitution.181  Certain states, like Massachusetts, employ this 
reasoning to extend protection to race-gender groups because their state 
constitution demands that a jury be representative of the community.182  
This reasoning could not be applied, however, to states that do not have 
similar constitutional provisions.183 
                                                 
179 See People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 181 (Cal. 1985) (holding that black women as a 
group should be considered cognizable); People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 250 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2009) (Catterson, J., dissenting) (advocating that peremptory challenges be 
prohibited if they are made on the basis of the combination of race and gender); Montoya, 
supra note 89, at 403 (advocating the expansion of Batson to combined race-gender groups 
by applying an intersectionality approach to peremptory challenges); supra note 95 and 
accompanying text (identifying courts that have expanded Batson to deem race-gender 
groups cognizable). 
180 See People v. Young, 105 P.3d 487, 541 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining 
that California has chosen an expansive definition of cognizable group in order to ―ensur[e] 
that no ‗perspective‘ that exists in the community at large be systematically excluded from 
the jury‖); Motton, 704 P.2d at 181–82 (―The trial court‘s comparison of black women as a 
cognizable group to ‗men who wear toupees‘ failed to acknowledge the ‗concurrence of 
racial and sexual identity,‘ . . . which informs the attitudes of this group.‖); see also 
Montoya, supra note 89, at 396–98 (offering examples of the way race-gender identity 
influences one‘s life experiences).  Montoya explains that even if African American women 
and other race-gender groups have not been excluded from American political life by 
historically explicit discriminatory laws, members of certain race-gender groups have been 
uniquely affected by race- and gender-based laws.  Id. at 398.  She justifies expansion of 
Batson to race-gender groups by explaining that ―jury deliberations stand to gain from the 
inclusion of black women.‖  Id. at 400.  Accepting this argument, this Note nevertheless 
asserts that a finding of this type of shared group experience would be sufficient to deem 
race-gender groups cognizable, but only if petit juries are required to reflect a fair cross-
section of the community.  See supra text accompanying notes 105–08 (explaining that 
certain states may require expansion of Batson protection to combined race-gender groups 
in order to properly include a fair cross-section of the community). 
181 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1990) (holding that the fair cross-section 
requirement does not extend to the petit jury); see also supra note 15 (discussing the fair 
cross-section requirement). 
182 See supra notes 105–08 (explaining that the Massachusetts Constitution applies a fair 
cross-section requirement to its petit jury, thus prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
race and gender during jury selection). 
183 See supra note 15 (explaining that the fair cross-section requirement does not extend to 
the petit jury).  Overall, because the Constitution does not require that the petit jury 
represent a fair cross-section of the community, states that do not require this in their state 
constitution are not compelled to prohibit race-gender-based challenges for the sole 
purpose of creating a more representative jury.  Cf. Holland, 493 U.S. at 486–87 (holding that 
the jury does not need to represent a fair cross-section of the community); Young, 105 P.3d 
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Second, the expansion of Batson is advocated in light of the historical 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of race-gender identity.184  
Notably, this analysis is frequently utilized when the racial group is a 
racial minority and the gender is female.185  There is also a strong 
argument that race-gender groups should receive heightened scrutiny 
under equal protection, even outside the peremptory challenge realm.186  
Traditional equal protection analysis demands that distinctions on the 
basis of race or gender receive heightened scrutiny; therefore, it logically 
follows that distinctions based on both classes also require heightened 
scrutiny.187 
                                                                                                             
at 541–42 (Brown, J., concurring) (recognizing that the decision to deem race-gender groups 
cognizable seems more in line with the expansive definition of cognizable group 
established in California cases as opposed to the definition set forth by federal courts). 
184 See Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Catterson, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
discriminatory laws historically targeted both women as well as racial and ethnic 
minorities, and that the discriminatory laws created ―social cross-currents‖ requiring race-
gender to be recognized as a cognizable group); see also supra note 102 (reviewing the 
history of discrimination against race-gender groups).  As illustrated in J.E.B., a past history 
of discrimination is one factor justifying the expansion of Batson.  See supra Part II.A 
(describing the J.E.B. Court‘s review of the history of gender discrimination).  This past 
history of discrimination also supports the argument that litigants may harbor unique, 
unarticulated biases against jurors who are members of these groups.  See supra note 102 
(discussing the effect that a past history of discrimination has on social interactions and 
stereotypes today); see also Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 459 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that 
discrimination against African American or Asian women is different from that against 
individuals based on age and disability because of unique discriminatory biases against 
race-gender groups); supra note 76 (discussing Luce v. Dalton).  Although Luce involved an 
employment discrimination claim based on two statutes rather than a peremptory 
challenge issue based on the Constitution, the court‘s statement is applicable to the analysis 
here.  Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461. 
185 See, e.g., Motton, 704 P.2d at 181–82 (holding that black women as a group should be 
considered protected for purposes of Batson); Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Catterson, J., 
dissenting) (advocating that black women should constitute a cognizable group); Montoya, 
supra note 89, at 403 (advocating the expansion of Batson to race-gender groups with an 
emphasis on African American females). 
186 Compare Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 39 (proposing strict scrutiny for discrimination 
against black women), with Smith, supra note 74, at 2028 (advocating the use of 
intermediate scrutiny when analyzing discrimination against African American females 
who are prevented from attending an all-male African American school). 
187 See supra Part II.A (discussing the application of equal protection to peremptory 
challenges).  The relevancy of this analysis, however, can be called into doubt when the 
discrimination in jury selection is based on the race-gender identity of groups that lack a 
history of discrimination. See Young, 105 P.3d at 541 (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining that 
there would need to be an adequate showing of a past history of discrimination to deem a 
specific race-gender group cognizable for purposes of Batson); see also supra note 102 
(discussing reports of statistics identifying disparate treatment of race-gender groups, 
which consequently support Batson‘s expansion in the case of African American women, 
but do not similarly justify the expansion of Batson to white males).  In any event, 
regardless of whether white males have experienced a past history of discrimination, they 
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Regardless of the level of scrutiny required by equal protection 
outside the Batson context, a juror‘s race, gender, or any combination 
thereof is completely unrelated to juror qualifications.188  The use of race 
or gender stereotypes in jury selection serves only as an impediment to 
securing a fair trial.189  Likewise, stereotypes based on a combination of 
race and gender also impede litigants from securing a fair trial.190  For 
courts to permit jurors to be struck solely because they belong to a 
particular race-gender group reinforces stereotypes about the group‘s 
competence, a consequence the Court has sought to prevent.191 
Expanding Batson is consistent with decisions regarding race-gender 
discrimination in employment.192  These decisions recognize that 
discrimination based on race-gender identity is a unique form of 
discrimination.193  Additionally, as Title VII jurisprudence progressed, 
                                                                                                             
would still receive protection through the expansion of Batson in light of the Court‘s 
response to a similar argument asserting that males should not receive protection from 
gender discrimination because they lack the same past history of discrimination as women.  
See supra note 53; see also supra note 67 (explaining that claims of reverse discrimination in 
the employment setting have been on the rise and recently received considerable media 
attention). 
188 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 n.6 (1994) (opining that the Court did not need 
to determine whether gender classifications are inherently suspect in order to determine 
that gender is an impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge); see also supra note 34 
(referencing the Batson Court‘s assertion that race plays no role in assessing a person‘s 
ability to serve on a jury). 
189 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 (―[W]e do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges as 
an institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination from 
the courtroom.  Instead, we consider whether peremptory challenges based on gender 
stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant‘s effort to secure a fair and impartial 
jury.‖). 
190 See id. (explaining that the Court will consider whether the attribute at issue is related 
to juror qualifications, and if not, as is the case with race and gender, a peremptory 
challenge on that basis is impermissible). 
191 See id. at 142 n.14.  The Court noted the following: 
[W]here peremptory challenges are made on the basis of group 
characteristics other than race or gender . . . they do not reinforce the 
same stereotypes about the group‘s competence or predispositions that 
have been used to prevent them from voting, participating on juries, 
pursuing their chosen professions, or otherwise contributing to civic 
life. 
Id. 
192 See supra Part II.B (describing the court‘s treatment of race-gender groups in 
employment discrimination cases). 
193 See supra Part II.B (discussing the evolution of the courts‘ acceptance of complex 
discrimination claims); see also Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 141–50 (applying 
intersectionality theory to discrimination in the employment context); Montoya, supra note 
89, at 403–04 (explaining intersectionality theory and applying it to peremptory challenges).  
Intersectionality theory, as pioneered by Kimberle Crenshaw, notes that individuals who 
claim combined race-gender discrimination face a different type of discrimination than that 
simply based on race or gender alone.  See Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 149; see also Kotkin, 
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some courts felt compelled to expand the sex-plus theory to sex-plus-
race.194  It seemed ―beyond belief‖ that courts could permit 
discrimination against black females (two protected categories), but 
prohibit discrimination based on a subgroup of one sex (a protected 
category plus an unprotected category).195  Similarly, commentators have 
advocated various groups be deemed cognizable for Batson purposes, 
most notably religious groups, even though the group does not 
traditionally receive heightened scrutiny.196  Likewise, it is beyond belief 
that courts would consider extending protection to a group of 
individuals who share mutable characteristics that lack a history of 
discrimination without first holding that race-gender groups are 
cognizable.197 
The decision to deem race-gender groups cognizable, although 
supported by legal precedent and logical analysis, is not sufficient on its 
own to prevent discrimination against race-gender groups.198  Even if 
race-gender groups are cognizable, litigants objecting to a peremptory 
challenge based on race-gender discrimination will face evidentiary 
issues different from those posed by challenges based solely on race or 
gender.199  For example, as Professor Kotkin first acknowledged in the 
employment law context, when a plaintiff alleging complex 
discrimination attempts to rebut an employer‘s neutral justification for 
an adverse employment action, the small number of individuals in the 
plaintiff‘s class may make it difficult to show that other members of the 
                                                                                                             
supra note 71, at 1486 (describing the application of intersectional scholarship to complex 
bias cases but asserting that this scholarship has not sufficiently addressed issues of proof 
that litigants face when bringing complex discrimination claims). 
194 See supra Part II.B (explaining that the courts expanded sex-plus to include combined 
race-gender discrimination, a form of sex-plus-race). 
195 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text (describing the courts‘ reasoning for 
expanding sex-plus to include sex-plus-race). 
196 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (identifying various courts and 
commentators expanding or advocating expansion of Batson protection to a variety of 
groups). 
197 Compare supra note 57 (listing various cases in which litigants encouraged the 
extension of Batson to other arguably cognizable groups), with supra note 79 (explaining 
that the Jefferies court found it unreasonable to proscribe discrimination based on factors 
other than race or gender until both race and gender, including the combination thereof, 
was also a prohibited basis for employment actions). 
198 See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text (explaining that it may be more 
difficult for a litigant to allege race-gender discrimination than it is for a litigant to allege 
race-based or gender-based discrimination). 
199 See infra note 200 and accompanying text (identifying issues raised by Professor 
Kotkin). 
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class also experienced discriminatory treatment.200  Similarly, it may be 
difficult for a litigant to establish that other members of the same race-
gender group were struck from the jury because there may not be many 
other potential jurors with the same race-gender background. 
Overall, race-gender groups must be cognizable so as to prevent 
discrimination on the basis of race or sex.201  Also, race-gender groups 
must be cognizable in light of the past history of discrimination against 
these groups.202  In light of the evidentiary issues discussed, the 
recognition of race-gender groups, under the current analysis or as an 
expansion of Batson, is insufficient to prohibit discrimination based on 
race and/or gender identity.203  The next section of this Note advocates 
the recognition of race-gender groups and proposes a model state statute 
that eases the burden for litigants who object to an allegedly race-gender-
based peremptory challenge.204 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Courts are struggling with determining the future for peremptory 
challenges.205  Despite the fact that both race and gender are improper 
bases for a peremptory strike, some courts have permitted a loophole 
around this command by permitting challenges based on race-gender 
identity.206  In addition to preventing review of unconstitutional 
peremptory challenges, the decision to permit race-gender-based 
challenges negates Batson‘s message of intolerance for discrimination.207  
In order to remedy this problem, the Supreme Court should hold that 
                                                 
200 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary burdens that 
make it difficult for plaintiffs alleging complex discrimination claims to rebut an 
employer‘s neutral justification for their actions). 
201 See supra Part III.B (asserting that even if race-gender groups are not given protection 
on their own, recognition of the group is necessary in order to prevent discrimination on 
the basis of race or sex alone). 
202 See supra note 184 (explaining that in light of the past history of discrimination against 
race-gender groups, Batson must be expanded to prohibit further discrimination against 
members of these groups). 
203 See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (predicting evidentiary problems that 
courts will likely face); see also infra Part IV (proposing a model state statute clarifying 
Batson‘s command and protecting race-gender identity). 
204 See infra Part IV (proposing a model state statute eliminating the requirement of a 
prima facie showing of discrimination at the first step of the Batson procedure and 
recognizing race-gender groups as cognizable). 
205 See supra Part II (identifying the state of the law regarding peremptory challenges and 
combined race-gender identity). 
206 See supra Part III.B (discussing one of the consequences of not recognizing race-gender 
groups). 
207 See supra Part III.C (examining the effect that race-gender-based peremptory 
challenges have on Batson‘s symbolic significance). 
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race-gender groups are cognizable at the first step of Batson.  The 
Supreme Court, however, recently avoided this issue in Rivera v. 
Illinois.208  Furthermore, if the experiences of plaintiffs alleging complex 
claims of discrimination foreshadow the experiences of litigants 
objecting to race-gender-based challenges, the mere recognition that 
race-gender groups are cognizable, without more, likely will not suffice 
to eradicate race-gender-based strikes.209  Another often suggested 
solution to the problems created by peremptory challenges is to simply 
abolish the challenge.210  As noted, it is unlikely the challenge will soon 
be abolished.211 
This Note proposes a model state statute that would resolve this 
issue.  First, this Note advocates the expansion of Batson to race-gender 
groups for the reasons articulated in Part III.212  Second, the proposed 
model state statute eliminates the requirement that a litigant establish a 
prima facie showing of discrimination at the first step of the Batson 
procedure, easing the burden for litigants who contend that a 
peremptory strike is based on race-gender identity.  States should adopt 
the following model statute adapted from the Louisiana Criminal 
Code:213 
Model State Statute 
A. No peremptory challenge made by the state or the 
defendant shall be based solely upon the race, or 
gender, or any combination thereof of the juror.  If an 
objection is made that the state or defense has 
excluded a juror solely on the basis of race or 
gender, on any of these prohibited bases or a combination 
thereof, and a prima facie case supporting that 
objection is made by the objecting party, the court 
                                                 
208 See supra Part II.C.3 (analyzing Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009)). 
209 See supra notes 82–86, 198–200 (identifying the evidentiary issues inherent in complex 
discrimination claims). 
210 See supra note 24 (mentioning alternative procedures that have been proposed by 
other commentators). 
211 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that despite the fact states are 
permitted to abolish peremptory challenges, most states have chosen to allow them, 
finding them to be an important tool for litigators). 
212 See supra Part III.D (identifying the justifications for expanding protection to combined 
race-gender groups under Batson). 
213 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795 (2010) (identifying the original text of the 
Louisiana statute, which was the basis for this model statute).  The normal font is the 
language of the original statute.  The text that appears in italics is the proposed language 
the author wishes to add, and the language with a line through it is the language the 
author wishes to strike from the original statute. 
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may demand a satisfactory race and/or gender 
neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge, 
unless the court is satisfied that such reason is 
apparent from the voir dire examination of the juror.  
Such demand and disclosure, if required by the 
court, shall be made outside of the hearing of any 
juror or prospective juror. 
 
B. The court shall allow to stand each peremptory 
challenge exercised for a race and/or gender neutral 
reason either apparent from the examination or 
disclosed by counsel when required by the court.  
The provisions of Paragraph C and this Paragraph 
shall not apply when both the state and the defense 
have exercised a challenge against the same juror. 
 
C. The court shall allow to stand each peremptory 
challenge for which a satisfactory racially race 
neutral and/or gender neutral reason is given.  Those 
jurors who have been peremptorily challenged and 
for whom no satisfactory racially race neutral and/or 
gender neutral reason is apparent or given may be 
ordered returned to the panel, or the court may take 
such other corrective action as it deems appropriate 
under the circumstances.  The court shall make 
specific findings regarding each such challenge. 
Commentary 
This model state statute makes the necessary changes to ensure that 
race-gender identity is prohibited from being used as a basis for 
peremptory challenges.  This will help to close any loophole that may 
permit litigants to strike jurors based on race or gender.214  It will also 
demonstrate that the judiciary does not tolerate discrimination in jury 
selection and combined race-gender discrimination is just as harmful as 
race-based or gender-based discrimination.215 
The language suggesting that a peremptory challenge may be based 
partially on race or gender has been deleted by omitting the word 
―solely‖ in Section A of the proposed statute.  This has been done to 
                                                 
214 See supra Part III.B (explaining one of the benefits of recognizing combined race-
gender identity). 
215 See supra Part III.C (identifying the symbolic significance of protecting combined race-
gender identity from discrimination in jury selection). 
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ensure that if a litigant offers a valid, non-discriminatory justification for 
a peremptory challenge coupled with a race, gender, or race-gender 
justification, the peremptory challenge must be denied by the court.216  
Even a sole impermissible justification suffices to render the peremptory 
challenge improper, as set forth in this model statute. 
Recognizing race-gender groups cognizable in this fashion also 
serves to encourage courts to be conscious of the reality that race-gender 
discrimination occurs and must be remedied.  As Professor Kotkin 
explained in her discussion regarding complex claims of employment 
discrimination, as courts become more cognizant of complex forms of 
discrimination, valid challenges to race-gender-based actions will be 
more likely to prevail.217 
Finally, language requiring a prima facie case of discrimination has 
been deleted.  This eliminates the prima facie requirement at the first 
step of the Batson procedure.  Once a party believes opposing counsel is 
making inappropriate peremptory challenges, the party can object, note 
the type of discrimination alleged, such as race, gender, or race-gender, 
and the opposing party must come forth with a neutral justification.  
This would lower the evidentiary burden a litigant must meet in order to 
object to a peremptory challenge, which is especially important when 
dealing with combined race-gender discrimination.218 
Some states may fear that elimination of the prima facie requirement 
in Batson will destroy the peremptory challenge.  This is not the case.  As 
discussed, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, and the 
Military Court of Appeals have eliminated the prima facie step and have 
not needed to eliminate the challenge altogether.219  Also, Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct prohibit litigants from using peremptory 
challenges solely for gamesmanship purposes.220  In sum, the 
                                                 
216 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (examining the issue of mixed motives 
and their place in peremptory challenge jurisprudence); supra note 161 (illustrating one 
way in which the failure to deem race-gender groups cognizable would prevent review of 
peremptory challenges that would normally be denied by the court if the court applies a 
dual motivation analysis). 
217 See supra text accompanying note 86 (proposing that as courts become more conscious 
of the danger of stereotypes about various groups, allegations of complex forms of 
discrimination will be more likely to prevail). 
218 See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (articulating the unique evidentiary 
concerns faced by litigants objecting to peremptory challenges based on combined race-
gender discrimination). 
219 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that Florida does not require a 
prima facie showing of discrimination as set forth by the Batson Court). 
220 See supra note 42 (discussing the safeguards already imposed on litigants that prevent 
a proliferation of needless Batson hearings from taking place if the first step of the Batson 
test is eliminated). 
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combination of recognizing race-gender identity as an impermissible 
basis for peremptory challenges and eliminating the prima facie 
requirement at the first step of Batson will ensure that jurors are not 
excluded from the jury because of their race, gender, or race-gender 
identity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Peremptory challenges are intended to assist litigants in selecting a 
fair and impartial jury.221  Despite the danger that they will be exercised 
in a discriminatory manner, courts and legislatures continue to permit 
their use.222  The peremptory challenge, however, is not exempt from the 
Equal Protection Clause.223  Past Supreme Court cases demonstrate that 
the judiciary is prepared to impose limitations on the peremptory 
challenge in order to protect a potential juror‘s right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of their race or gender.224 
In the true spirit of Batson, states should ensure that potential jurors 
are not brought in for voir dire simply to be excused due to their race-
gender identity.225  The jurors discussed in the introductory hypothetical 
will never know why they were asked to leave the courtroom that day.  
Did the prosecutor notice a juror‘s facial expression showing empathy 
for the defendant?  Or was the prosecutor acting on illegitimate 
stereotypes about black men?  Until race-gender identity is recognized as 
a discrete, protected class for purposes of peremptory challenges, future 
potential jurors who face this situation will be sent home feeling rejected 
by a system that is supposed to ensure justice for all.226 
The courts have made great progress in working to eliminate 
discrimination in our society, as illustrated through Batson and its 
progeny prohibiting race- and gender-based strikes.  It is time for state 
legislatures to take the next step; prohibit race-gender-based peremptory 
challenges.  Author Dorothy Allison‘s quote, which begins this Note, is 
especially pertinent in this setting.227  ―Class, race, sexuality, gender—
                                                 
221 See supra note 18 (identifying the purpose of peremptory challenges). 
222 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra Part II.A (describing the application of equal protection to the peremptory 
challenge). 
224 See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Supreme Court has demonstrated that it will 
impose restrictions on peremptory challenges when necessary to abide by the requirements 
of the Equal Protection Clause). 
225 See supra Part III.D (advocating expansion of Batson to groups based on race-gender 
identity). 
226 See supra note 167 (repeating Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion that Batson is a reflection of 
―what this Nation stands for‖). 
227 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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and all other categories by which we categorize and dismiss each other—
need to be excavated from the inside.‖228  In order to avoid the 
perpetuation of race, gender, and race-gender stereotypes, race-gender-
based peremptory challenges must be eliminated. 
Leah M. Provost* 
                                                 
228 ALLISON, supra note 1, at 35. 
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